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INTRODUCTION 
During the first months of 2018, two short pieces on legal education 
were published.  One reported on the results of a survey of college 
graduates, law school graduates, and holders of other advanced degrees.1  
The study found that today’s post-law graduates were less likely than 
their pre-recession counterparts to report that the J.D. degree was worth 
the cost and more likely to have second thoughts about their decision to 
go to law school.2  The findings prompted Aaron Taylor, executive 
director of the Access Lex Center for Legal Education Excellence, to 
conclude that there are “two distinct worlds of law graduates” made up 
of “[t]he ones who graduated during and after the recession [that began 
in 2008].  Those in the former group paid less for their degrees and they 
had an easier time finding good employment.  The latter group paid more 
and had a harder time finding good employment.”3   
 
 1. See Karen Sloan, Law Grads Have Grown Skeptical of a JD’s Value, LAW.COM (Jan. 
17, 2018, 2:21 PM), https://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2018/01/16/law-grads-have-grown-
skeptical-of-a-jds-value/. 
 2. Id. at 2. 
 3. Id. 
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The second piece was an open letter to Harvard law students from 
alumnus Ralph Nader.4  In his letter, Nader decried his alma mater’s 
failure to recognize the obligations of public service that come with 
being part of a learned profession.5  He urged students to become aware 
of “the distinction between charity and justice.”6  As he explained, 
“charitable work by lawyers is about immediate assistance, while 
advancing justice is structural work that foresees and forestalls the 
conditions that give rise to the ever-growing need for charity.”7  He 
exhorted students not to “trivialize your estimable talents for lucrative 
returns” because “[k]eeping your conscience at home while selling your 
talents is a very high price to pay during the fifty years or so you will 
practice law.”8  He recommended that students be broadly curious and 
“passionately attach [themselves] to some mission for more structural 
justice.”9 
A reader unfamiliar with the field of law could not be faulted for 
wondering whether these two pieces, published almost 
contemporaneously, are referring to the same profession.  While one 
emphasizes whether a career in law is a satisfactory financial 
proposition, the other focuses on the duties of lawyers to advance the 
greater good.  This Article asks how such utterly distinct images of the 
legal profession and legal education have come to exist side by side and 
how this ongoing juxtaposition poses special challenges for law and 
leadership.  These parallel accounts of professionalism have deep roots 
in the historical evolution of modern American lawyering.  The 
organized bar has embraced a model of “social trustee 
professionalism,”10 which treats law as a learned profession with public-
regarding obligations.  As social trustees, attorneys are to use their 
 
 4. See Ralph Nader, An Open Letter to Harvard Law Students, THE HARVARD LAW 
RECORD (Feb. 12, 2018), http://hlrecord.org/2018/02/an-open-letter-to-harvard-law-
students/. 
 5. See id. 
 6. Id. at 2. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 3. 
 9. Id. at 4 (emphasis in original). 
 10. STEVEN BRINT, IN AN AGE OF EXPERTS 36 (1994).  In scholarship on legal ethics, 
social trustee professionalism maps onto a “public interest” model of professional 
responsibility in which an attorney owes duties to the court and to innocent third parties as 
well as to clients.  WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 8 (1998).  For a skeptical 
view of this model and the ethical norms it establishes, see Richard L. Abel, Why Does the 
ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639, 653, 668 (1981) (social trusteeship is 
more rhetorical than real and primarily serves to legitimate the profession’s market control) 
[hereinafter Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?]; Norman W. Spaulding, 
The Myth of Civic Republicanism: Interrogating the Ideology of Antebellum Legal Ethics, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1397, 1397, 1400-09, 1447 (2003) (questioning whether morally activist, 
civic republican lawyering ever enjoyed a dominant place in the American legal profession). 
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complex knowledge and skills to serve both individual clients and the 
greater good.11  Attorneys become “double agents”12 in ways that 
potentially pit the private and self-regarding interests of clients against a 
more selfless and public-regarding concern for collective welfare.  The 
precise parameters of that trade-off have never been entirely clear.  At 
times, the greater good has been equated with protecting the justice 
system by upholding norms of formal neutrality and impartiality and 
rejecting a “win-at-all-costs” mentality.13  Yet, regard for the public 
welfare can have broader implications: Lawyers may aspire to advance 
social justice in ways that blur the line between law and politics.14  
Striking the right balance between private interests and public values has 
undoubtedly been difficult—if not impossible—to achieve.  Given these 
difficulties, some attorneys have turned away from social trusteeship 
altogether to embrace expert professionalism, which defines a mastery 
of knowledge and skills as the sole basis for status and respect. 15  This 
market-based approach treats expertise as a private commodity to be 
bought and sold.  Far from being a double agent, then, a lawyer’s only 
obligation is to advance a client’s objectives—at a price.16   
To understand the ongoing and unresolved status of these 
competing concepts of professionalism, it is useful to trace how lawyers’ 
identities evolved during three prior ages of modern American 
lawyering.  The first age emerged in response to industrialization and 
urbanization during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.  With 
the rise of large corporations, a new breed of lawyer emerged to serve 
the business community, most notably in the urban centers of New York 
and Chicago.  To temper an image of attorneys as nothing but the tools 
of wealthy industrial clients, corporate lawyers assumed leading roles in 
 
 11. BRINT, supra note 10, at 36-37; RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 16 (1989) 
[hereinafter ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS]. 
 12. Robert W. Gordon, “The Ideal and the Actual in the Law”: Fantasies and Practices 
of New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS 53 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 
1984).  See also Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts 
the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 955 (2000) (“The dual role of [safeguarding the 
justice system and distributing goods through private commercial markets] causes internal 
conflict in the profession.”). 
 13. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY: THE CRISIS AND PROMISE OF 
PROFESSIONALISM IN AMERICA 2-4, 67-68, 81-82 (2d ed. 2005). 
 14. See Richard L. Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism, 
32 UCLA L. REV. 474, 490-92 (1985) [hereinafter Abel, Law Without Politics]. 
 15. BRINT, supra note 10, at 8-9.  In legal ethics scholarship, expert professionalism 
maps onto an “agency loyalty” model in which the lawyer’s sole duty is one of fidelity to the 
client’s interests.  The lawyer must refrain from evaluating the legitimacy or wisdom (as 
opposed to legality) of their desire.  SIMON, supra note 10, at 7; Stephen L. Pepper, The 
Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 613. 
 16. BRINT, supra note 10, at 40-41. 
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the organized bar and embraced social trustee professionalism to 
highlight their public-spiritedness.  Social trusteeship was used to justify 
new ethical constraints on commercial practices like advertising and 
“ambulance chasing” that might confuse law practice with a profit-
seeking trade.17  At the same time, bar leaders pushed for high standards 
of admission to practice to make clear that law was an intellectual 
enterprise distinct from both the world of business and the rough-and-
tumble of politics.  As a result, law schools played a pivotal part in 
elaborating social trustee professionalism, even as they began to 
emphasize the knowledge and skills at the core of expert 
professionalism.18   
The second age of modern American lawyering accompanied the 
rise of the New Deal.  The nation’s economic collapse during the Great 
Depression left many Americans impoverished and doubtful that the free 
market would protect ordinary people against the depredations of 
capitalism. 19  With courts perceived as obstructing reform on formalist 
grounds, New Deal attorneys invoked the power of the political branches 
to deploy law in the service of the general good.  The upshot was the rise 
of government lawyers, who specialized in administrative law and 
regulatory practice.  In implementing New Deal reforms, these lawyers 
challenged the prerogatives of the corporate bar and ultimately created 
their own power base.20  Despite the profound shift in lawyering, bar 
leaders did not make far-reaching changes to standards of professional 
conduct in response to this emerging form of practice.21  Nor did law 
schools alter their curricula in fundamental ways to prepare students for 
new responsibilities.  Faced with a normative void, government lawyers 
justified their newfound authority on grounds of expertise, much as 
economists or other technical experts in the New Deal’s brain trust did.  
This sharp turn to expert professionalism contradicted the tradition of 
social trusteeship, but any nascent conflict was deflected by treating 
government lawyers as inherently public-minded because they served an 
amorphous client known as “the people.” 22 
The third age of modern American lawyering came about during 
the campaign to promote civil rights, initially for blacks and later for 
 
 17. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 42-43 (1976). 
 18. See infra notes 75-81. 
 19. See RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY 162-63 (1995). 
 20. See infra notes 162-66 and accompanying text. 
 21. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, supra note 10, at 644 (ethical 
rules do not address “the distinctive situation of the lawyer employed by business or 
government”).   
 22. See infra notes 170-77 and accompanying text. 
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other marginalized groups.23  The success of the civil rights movement 
led to the rise of cause lawyering,24 which cast attorneys’ obligation to 
promote the general welfare in a fresh light.  Cause lawyers moved well 
beyond protecting the integrity of the legal and judicial process by 
emphasizing structural reforms that required political intervention.25  
But, in contrast to government lawyers, these attorneys did so as 
outsiders who challenged conventional uses of power and authority.  
Even as cause lawyers tested the boundaries of social trustee 
professionalism, they rejected the narrowness of expert 
professionalism.26  In their view, lawyers were not mere instruments of 
clients’ desires but instead had to work collaboratively with clients and 
communities to identify and implement reform.27  Ironically, though, 
cause lawyering sowed the seeds of an intensified commitment to 
market-based expert professionalism.  Cause lawyers successfully 
challenged ethical prohibitions on advertising and solicitation, which in 
turn unleashed newfound competitiveness for clients and revenues 
among attorneys.28  Cause lawyering raised profound questions about 
professionalism, but the organized bar and legal educators left most of 
these questions unanswered, further complicating the uneasy 
relationship between social trustee and expert professionalism.   
Understanding the three ages of modern American lawyering can 
help us to contemplate whether there is currently a crisis in the legal 
profession and legal education, whether that crisis is leading us to a 
fourth age of lawyering, and how best to approach this momentous 
 
 23. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 117-37 (1977) for the early origins of this 
movement. 
 24. The term “cause lawyering” is itself a subject of debate and vies with other terms like 
“social justice lawyering,” “public interest lawyering,” “rebellious lawyering,” and 
“lawyering for social change.”  Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering: 
Toward an Understanding of the Motivation and Commitment of Social Justice Lawyers, in 
CAUSE LAWYERING 31, 33 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds. 1998). 
 25. Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of 
Professional Authority, in CAUSE LAWYERING 4 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds. 1998) 
[hereinafter Sarat & Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of Professional 
Authority]. 
 26. Stuart Scheingold, The Struggle to Politicize Legal Practice, in CAUSE LAWYERING 
128 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds. 1998). 
 27. Sarat & Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of Professional 
Authority, supra note 25, at 3-4; DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE xxv (1988); Gary 
Bellow, Steady Work: A Practitioner’s Reflections on Political Lawyering, 31 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 297, 300, 302-04 (1996). 
 28. See, e.g., JAMES E. MOLITERNO, THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION IN CRISIS 71-
75, 79-88 (2013); see STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE 
IN 9, 23-24 (2004) [hereinafter SARAT & SCHEINGOLD, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN]; Scott 
Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1, 13-15 (2004); Sarat & Scheingold, 
Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of Professional Authority, supra note 25, at 3-4; John 
Kilwein, Still Trying: Cause Lawyering for the Poor and Disadvantaged in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania, in CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 24, at 181, 183-86. 
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question.  Much of the current sense of crisis stems from the 
restructuring of the market for expertise.29  These changes lie behind 
Aaron Taylor’s conclusion that pre- and post-recession law graduates 
inhabit different worlds.  Some commentators have gone even farther.  
For them, market restructuring seems so profound that it calls into 
question the ongoing relevance of professionalism, a shift that would 
surely augur a marked departure from earlier ages of modern American 
lawyering.30  Market restructuring also has posed new questions about 
whether social trustee professionalism will be displaced in the rush for 
revenue, often with a focus on large law firm attorneys, as Ralph Nader’s 
open letter makes clear.31  This growing emphasis on the bottom line has 
left many law students and lawyers, even public interest lawyers, 
wondering whether a dedication to the greater good is a personal rather 
than professional commitment.32  The notion that being a lawyer is 
divorced from any larger social obligations again would represent a 
notable shift from earlier ages of American lawyering.   
To address these challenges, bar leaders and legal educators must 
carefully evaluate how market forces are reshaping expert 
professionalism to determine whether social trustee professionalism 
eventually will be crowded out or whether professionalism itself will 
cease to be a useful tool for understanding lawyers’ identities.  That 
assessment will need to take place not just in large law firms but in solo 
practices, small and mid-sized firms, public interest organizations, and 
government agencies.  Efforts to study professionalism should go 
beyond an analysis of technical knowledge to identify a broad portfolio 
of skills that predict success in law practice.  Moreover, there should be 
a recognition that the meaning of social trusteeship can differ across 
practice sectors, especially when comparing law firms to government 
agencies and public interest organizations.  Ideally, these inquiries will 
offer a more nuanced picture of the ways in which lawyers understand 
 
 29. For descriptions of the current sense of crisis, see, e.g., BENJAMIN BARTON, GLASS 
HALF FULL 55-103, 121-29 (2015); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 71-84, 
107-66 (2012).  But cf. Bryant G. Garth, Crises, Crisis Rhetoric, and Competition in Legal 
Education: A Sociological Perspective on the (Latest) Crisis of the Legal Profession and 
Legal Education, 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 503, 504-05, 506-09 (2013) (a sense of crisis is 
a recurring feature of the legal profession and legal education); Richard L. Abel, “You Never 
Want a Serious Crisis to Go to Waste.”  Reflections on the Reform of Legal Education in the 
U.S., UK, and Australia, 22 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 3, 3-4, 5, 16 (2015) [hereinafter Abel, You 
Never Want a Serious Crisis to Go to Waste]. 
 30. THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 71-128 (2010); Russell 
Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will 
Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1246-69 (1995). 
 31. See, e.g., William D. Henderson & Marc Galanter, The Elastic Tournament: The 
Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 1906-1913 (2008). 
 32. See John Bliss, Divided Selves: Professional Role Distancing Among Law Students 
and New Lawyers in a Period of Market Crisis, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 855, 890 (2017). 
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their work and allow law schools to prepare students to navigate their 
own careers effectively. 
I. THE FIRST AGE OF MODERN AMERICAN LAWYERING: THE RISE OF 
CORPORATE LAW AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE UNIVERSITY LAW 
SCHOOL 
Before turning to the first age of modern American lawyering, it is 
worth observing that law’s status as a profession is of ancient vintage.  
Law, along with medicine and theology, was one of three original 
professions that emerged in England in the late medieval period.33  
Professionals catered to the needs of the landed gentry: Doctors would 
attend to the mortal flesh, lawyers to the material wealth, and ministers 
to the eternal soul of the most privileged members of society.34  The 
success of this arrangement turned on the trust that professionals 
engendered by acquiring the gentlemanly characteristics of their 
clients.35  The elite nature of the legal profession was exported to the 
American colonies, where a system of apprenticeships preserved 
exclusivity through closed social networks.36  During the early years of 
the republic, the typical lawyer practiced alone or in a small firm and 
often held other jobs simultaneously.37  With law in a fairly rudimentary 
state, technical expertise at times was secondary to “forensic bravura” in 
cementing a lawyer’s reputation.38 
Like their English counterparts, American lawyers served an elite 
clientele but distinguished themselves by using these intimate 
associations to assume a leading role in the nation-building process—so 
much so that in the 1830s, Alexander de Tocqueville dubbed attorneys 
America’s aristocracy.39  The gentleman-lawyer’s conspicuously 
advantaged status ultimately triggered a populist backlash that lasted 
from the late 1820s through the early 1850s.  Reacting to fears that the 
legal profession was indifferent to the common people, Jacksonian 
democrats eliminated barriers to law practice as a way to diminish 
 
 33. BRINT, supra note 10, at 26-27; Robin Middlehurst & Tom Kennie, Leading 
Professionals: Toward New Concepts of Professionalism, in THE END OF THE PROFESSIONS? 
50-51 (Jane Broadbent et al. eds. 1997).   
 34. BRINT, supra note 10, at 27. 
 35. Id. at 27-28; Jane Broadbent, Michael Dietrich, and Jennifer Roberts, The End of the 
Professions?, in THE END OF THE PROFESSIONS?, supra note 33, at 3. 
 36. MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM 10-13 (1977); BRINT, 
supra note 10, at 8. 
 37. BARTON, supra note 29, at 20-21; ANTON-HERMAN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 27-28 (1965). 
 38. LARSON, supra note 36, at 125-26; CHROUST, supra note 37, at 27. 
 39. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 281-90 (1945); LARSON, supra 
note 36, at 111, 168-69. 
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practitioners’ perceived privilege.  These changes did little to unsettle 
the prerogatives of gentlemen-lawyers but devastated the fledgling bar.40 
During the late 1800s and early 1900s, the rise of industrialization 
and urbanization coincided with concentrated wealth; indeed, this era 
was dubbed the Gilded Age.41  With economic restructuring, a new kind 
of client emerged: the large American corporation.  Corporate clients 
sought advice on novel and complex business questions, and leading 
lawyers formed firms in the urban centers of New York and Chicago to 
accommodate these demands.42  Due to the broad range of knowledge 
required to serve a corporate client’s needs, firms grew larger and 
developed specialty practices.43  Corporate attorneys counseled clients 
on major transactions and kept them out of lawsuits.  Technical expertise 
and prudent judgment, rather than dramatic courtroom flair, became the 
key to success.44 
A. The Innovation of Social Trustee Professionalism: The Organized 
Bar’s Push for Ethical Canons and Educational Reform 
The power and prominence of the corporate bar gave birth to the 
first age of modern American lawyering and the innovation of social 
trustee professionalism.  Close relationships between corporate lawyers 
and business leaders led to renewed skepticism about the legal 
profession’s sensitivity to the needs of everyday people, a painful 
reminder of the Jacksonian era.45  A model of social trustee 
professionalism offered an attractive solution by anchoring lawyers’ 
authority and status not just in demonstrated mastery of specialized 
knowledge and skills but also in an obligation to serve the greater good.46  
By treating law as a calling rather than an ordinary occupation, social 
 
 40. LARSON, supra note 36, at 104, 124-25, 145; Robert W. Gordon, Professors and 
Policymakers: Yale Law School Faculty in the New Deal and After, in HISTORY OF THE YALE 
LAW SCHOOL 75, 78 (Anthony T. Kronman ed. 2004). 
 41. SEAN DENNIS CASHMAN, AMERICA IN THE GILDED AGE (3d ed. 1993). 
 42. LARSON, supra note 36, at 170.  Interestingly, descriptions of lawyers as “natural 
aristocrats” persisted, but this time their status was linked to the fact that they would “not . . . 
litigate but . . . [would] work with businessmen, especially in Wall Street.”  ROBERT STEVENS, 
LAW SCHOOL 23 (1983) (quoting Benjamin Silliman, Commencement Address at Columbia 
Law School (1867)).  This shift would be reflected in innovations in legal education.  For 
those who embraced Langdell’s vision of legal science, the lawyer-statesmen of an earlier era 
were dismissed as “oratorical windbags.” Gordon, supra note 40, at 79. 
 43. ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER 8 (1988); John P. Heinz, Robert L. 
Nelson, & Edward O. Laumann, The Scale of Justice: Observations on the Transformation of 
Urban Law Practice, 27 ANN. REV. SOC. 337, 338-39, 342-46 (2001). 
 44. LARSON, supra note 36, at 170. 
 45. Id.; see also MICHAEL POWELL, FROM PATRICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL ELITE 9-11 
(1988); BRINT, supra note 10, at 33 (cleavages between corporate lawyers and other attorneys 
hampered solidarity in the profession). 
 46. BRINT, supra note 10, at 36-37; LARSON, supra note 36, at 28. 
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trustee professionalism distinguished lawyers from tradesmen motivated 
by wages as well as entrepreneurs motivated by profits.47  The esoteric 
nature of legal expertise coupled with a public-spirited commitment to 
service enabled the bar to justify special treatment for its members, most 
notably self-regulation and monopoly privileges.48   
Insofar as public-regarding claims remained largely rhetorical, 
there was a risk that lawyers would be unmasked as mere hired guns who 
used their expertise to single-mindedly advance clients’ interests.  The 
bar hit upon a strategy that would demonstrate its authentic regard for 
the public while advancing some interests of its own.  This strategy 
turned on highlighting the need for quality control in the profession to 
protect society from unfit practitioners.  Elite members of the organized 
bar were alarmed that immigrant and Jewish lawyers had been entering 
the profession in unprecedented numbers.49  Bar leaders feared that these 
newcomers would lower the esteem in which the profession was held—
because of both their social origins and the cases they would bring.  
Struggling to find a niche in urban legal markets, foreign-born and 
Jewish attorneys often represented the poor and working class in 
disputes over wages, industrial accidents, and labor practices.50  
Corporate attorneys quickly concluded that with clients like these, the 
arriviste lawyers were no gentlemen.51  Still, given that Jacksonian 
reforms had devastated the organized bar only a few decades before, 
powerful practitioners had to appear principled and public-minded even 
as they sought to thwart the influx of new attorneys.52   
Founded in 1878,53 the American Bar Association (ABA) addressed 
the difficulty in two ways, both designed to preserve elite prerogatives.  
First, in 1908, the ABA adopted a Canon of Ethics, which states quickly 
 
 47. LARSON, supra note 36, at 61. 
 48. Id. at 12, 14-15, 46, 48, 52-54, 222-23; JAMES W. HURST, THE GROWTH OF 
AMERICAN LAW 323 (1950); BRINT, supra note 10, at 34, 67, 69; Broadbent et al., supra note 
35, at 22-23; Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An 
Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2581, 2583-84 (1999). 
 49. AUERBACH, supra note 17, at 40-41; Jerold S. Auerbach, Enmity and Amity: Law 
Teachers and Practitioners, 1900-22, 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 551, 574-75, 
578-80, 584-86 (1971) [hereinafter Auerbach, Enmity and Amity: Law Teachers and 
Practitioners]. 
 50. AUERBACH, supra note 17, at 40-41; LARSON, supra note 36, at 173. 
 51. LARSON, supra note 36, at 173-74; AUERBACH, supra note 17, at 50-52; Auerbach, 
Enmity and Amity: Law Teachers and Practitioners, supra note 49, at 585-86. 
 52. LARSON, supra note 36, at 119 (noting the distrust of lawyers as agents of the wealthy 
during the period of Jacksonian democracy); Michael S. Ariens, American Legal Ethics in an 
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adopted.54  In response to anxieties about the commercialization of law 
practice, the Canon prohibited advertising and aggressive solicitation of 
clients and subjected contingent fees to special scrutiny.55  The 
provisions effectively codified a vision of practice based on “a small 
homogeneous community whose members enjoyed shared values, ease 
of communication, and a network of mutually reinforcing educational, 
religious, and social ties.”56  This approach worked well for attorneys in 
small towns as well as for the tight-knit, upper-class bar in large cities.  
However, the strictures hampered urban lawyers who served poor, 
immigrant, and working-class clients unfamiliar with how to obtain legal 
assistance.57  As historian Jerold Auerbach notes, the ABA’s ethical code 
“consigned the lawyer to his office to await a client who wandered by 
with a case that assured fame and fortune, and attributed success (hardly 
unrelated in American society to material accumulation) to good 
character.”58  The upshot was that “[a]mbulance chasers became the 
scapegoats in a heterogeneous profession increasingly populated by 
foreign-born lawyers.”59   
A similar dynamic arose at the local level.  In New York City, for 
instance, patrician elites founded the Association of the Bar of the City 
of New York (ABCNY), an organization so exclusive that it represented 
only about ten percent of the profession one year after its founding in 
1870.60  This allowed the “best men” of the bar to distance themselves 
from the undeserving and uncouth who treated law like a trade.61  
Membership was so restricted that nearly forty years later, in 1908, the 
New York County Lawyers Association was founded to represent the 
profession as a whole.62  Though its membership grew rapidly, it did not 
challenge the ABCNY’s dominant position, which was grounded in the 
power and influence of its privileged members.63 
To preserve the corporate bar’s prerogatives, the ABA took a 
second and perhaps even more momentous step: increasing the 
educational requirements for admission to practice.  The campaign to 
raise standards reflected longstanding resistance to “[t]he idea that law 
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was a trade to be learned like any other.”64  Bar leaders believed that 
shifting from unregulated apprenticeships to standardized formal 
training would distinguish law as a calling.  At the same time, a common 
educational experience could weed out the unworthy and unify an 
otherwise fragmented profession.65  Beginning in the late 1800s, ABA 
officials endorsed the superiority of law school training, and in 1900, 
these efforts spawned the Association of American Law Schools 
(AALS), an organization of academics dedicated to promoting the 
interests of “reputable” schools.66  The AALS initially was formed 
because of law faculty’s dissatisfaction with the slow pace of reform in 
legal education, but the ABA and the AALS eventually forged a close 
working partnership.67 Their joint efforts to elevate standards at first met 
with little success.68  Instead, the number of lawyers continued to grow, 
and law schools of all kinds proliferated.69   
Bar leaders felt especially aggrieved by these setbacks because of 
the rapid progress the medical profession had made in controlling 
practitioner quality through enhanced educational requirements.70  In 
1904, the American Medical Association founded the Council on 
Medical Education, which obtained Carnegie Foundation support for a 
comprehensive study done under the direction of educator Abraham 
Flexner.71  The Flexner report, published in 1910, prompted states to 
impose higher admissions standards for medical schools and to require 
“scientific” instruction by qualified faculty in suitable medical 
facilities.72  These mandates succeeded in driving out marginal 
institutions, particularly part-time and night medical schools.73  The 
thoroughgoing transformation of medical education was “galling” to 
ABA leaders who had long worried about the deleterious effects of 
proprietary law schools with part-time programs of questionable 
quality.74   
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B. Analytical Legal Education, Expert Professionalism, and the 
“Harvardization” of Law Schools 
Flexner triumphed by arguing that “formal analytical reasoning, the 
kind of thinking integral to the natural sciences, should enjoy pride of 
place in the intellectual training of physicians.”75  Thanks to Christopher 
Columbus Langdell, dean of the Harvard Law School, the bar was able 
to make similar arguments about legal education, tacitly drawing on a 
paradigm that prized technical expertise over other professional virtues.  
In the late 1800s, Langdell pioneered a number of reforms based on a 
model of scientific inquiry, which he called the case method.76  This 
method allowed students to discover legal principles by treating 
appellate cases as data points that led to inferences about doctrinal 
rules.77  Students could master these techniques through Socratic 
instruction that forced them to extract underlying legal principles from 
carefully curated decisions.78  The “Harvardization”79 of the law school 
curriculum justified heightened admissions criteria so that students 
would have the intellectual capacity necessary to master this complex 
method.80  Like Flexner’s approach to medicine, Langdell’s account of 
law linked the profession to “a unitary, self-contained, value-free, and 
consistent set of principles.”81  Langdell believed that young faculty, 
untainted by lengthy experience in practice, would absorb the method, 
transmit it to students, and develop an independent voice to counter the 
bar’s conventional thinking.82 
Langdell’s emphasis on the science of law often has been equated 
with a desire for academic respectability and an aversion to identification 
as a trade school.83  But there is likely more to the story than that.  
Though rooted in the bar’s efforts to promote social trustee 
professionalism, the embrace of scientific methods of instruction planted 
the seeds of expert professionalism by sidelining efforts to develop the 
meaning of public obligation.  While elaborating the case method, 
Langdell and his disciples studiously avoided matters of public law 
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despite the nascent growth of legislation and regulation.  That artful 
maneuver was motivated in part by market considerations.  Schools that 
taught law as statecraft repeatedly failed, while those that focused on 
private practice thrived.84  A value-neutral science also was an appealing 
way to deflect the aftermath of recent ruptures that had rocked Harvard 
Law School and strained its bonds of collegiality.  There were, for 
example, profound disagreements about slavery in the 1850s, federal 
authority over the South in the postbellum era, and the rise of large-scale 
capitalist enterprises at the turn of the century.85  Professors elsewhere 
on campus had been dismissed when they took positions on these issues 
that offended conservative trustees of the Harvard Corporation.86  As 
legal historian Robert W. Gordon observes, “[a] law dean trying to sell 
the practical virtues of a theoretical training to a skeptical and 
conservative bar might well want to avoid the swamp of interdisciplinary 
work and the third rail of public law and policy issues.”87   
The case method consolidated a narrow notion of obligation, one 
that focused on law as a self-contained, largely private universe in which 
attorneys fulfilled their public responsibilities by assisting courts in 
administering justice and developing doctrine.  Between 1870 and 1920, 
Harvard’s instructional approach became so dominant that some feared 
it was an “educational octopus.”88  In fact, Harvard’s wide reach 
normalized and legitimated uniform instructional standards that 
entrenched the case method and thus limited efforts to develop the 
meaning of public obligation elsewhere, for example, at part-time and 
night schools that served immigrant lawyers who became active in 
politics.89  As the educational octopus spread, the ABA successfully 
sought funding from the Carnegie Foundation for two studies to evaluate 
legal education.90  The first of these, the Redlich report, was published 
in 1914 and addressed ongoing controversy about whether all law 
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schools should be Harvardized.91  The Carnegie Corporation chose Josef 
Redlich, a law professor from the University of Vienna, to serve as a 
neutral arbiter among the warring factions.92   
Redlich, an outsider steeped in the civil law traditions of his home 
country, endorsed the case method with some reservations.93  He 
acknowledged its advantages as a tool for practical training of lawyers.  
Unlike classroom lectures, the Socratic method engaged students and 
forced them to think for themselves.94  However, Redlich rejected some 
of the method’s scientific pretensions.  In his view, forcing students to 
grapple with cases was just a more refined version of an apprenticeship, 
which also used judicial decisions as raw material but in a far less 
structured way.95  Moreover, Redlich questioned the theoretical 
foundations of the case method as a form of natural science.  In his view, 
law was “a normative science (Normwissenschaft)” that “does not work 
. . . with physical facts, but with the products of the human will, which 
has been directed to the ordering and guidance of the individual and 
social life of humanity.”96  Precisely because law was a set of “definite 
norms, willed by men, and intended to guide and limit the business of 
men,”97  Redlich called on law professors to systematize and reform 
doctrine rather than serve as “industrious commentator[s]” who merely 
described it.98  His report, while affirming the worth of the case method, 
prodded legal educators to acknowledge the potentially far-reaching 
implications of social trustee professionalism, implications that 
Langdellian formalism had elegantly elided. 
The second Carnegie-funded report by Alfred Z. Reed was 
published in 1921 and raised new questions about the ABA’s vision for 
legal education.99  Reed, a non-lawyer member of the Carnegie staff, was 
another outsider to the profession.100  By design, his study amplified 
Redlich’s, which had been based on observations of just ten of the over 
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120 schools then in operation.  All ten were elite institutions that mainly 
relied on the case method.101  Redlich had recognized stratification in 
legal education,102 but Reed made it a centerpiece of his evaluation.  
Reed acknowledged the relevance of social trustee professionalism by 
noting not only law’s private aspects but also its role as “part of the 
governing mechanism of the state,” which made it “in a broad sense 
political.”103  With lawyers performing a wide variety of tasks in the 
public and private domain, Reed found the notion of a unified bar 
inherently implausible.  He called for different types of law schools to 
prepare students for distinct sectors of practice.104 Reed’s conclusions 
were anathema to bar leaders and legal educators seeking to standardize 
law schools and consolidate the profession’s standing.  The ABA, 
working closely with the AALS, responded that same year with the Root 
report, which asserted that: “In spite of the diversity of human relations 
with respect to which the work of lawyers is done, the intellectual 
requisites are in all cases substantially the same . . . .  All require high 
moral character and substantially the same intellectual preparation.”105   
Despite some unexpected findings in the two Carnegie reports, the 
ABA and AALS ultimately prevailed in implementing most of their 
reform agenda.  After World War I, the organized bar enjoyed newfound 
respect because of legal services rendered to veterans and others in need 
during the conflict.106  Buoyed by this goodwill, the ABA finally began 
to make progress in its push for elevated standards.  Formal training at 
academic law schools became increasingly uniform and largely 
displaced apprenticeships.107  Though proprietary law schools and part-
time night programs survived, they were modeled on elite academic law 
schools.108  Efforts to raise standards culminated in today’s system of 
law school accreditation, which promotes a unified vision of preparation 
for law practice by asking all law schools to demonstrate the 
qualifications of students and faculty, the rigor of the curriculum, the 
soundness of facilities, and the adequacy of library resources.109   
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C. Legal Aid Societies and the Limited Vision of Social Trustee 
Professionalism 
Even as the Harvardization of law schools promoted uniformity in 
instruction and restricted access to legal training, the limits of the bar’s 
vision for social trustee professionalism were revealed through the 
ongoing failure to meet the legal needs of burgeoning poor and 
immigrant populations in urban areas.  The German Society of New 
York founded the first legal aid society in 1876 out of concern for the 
fate of a growing number of immigrants from the homeland.110  
Eventually, the society broadened its mission to serve all needy clients 
in the city, but by the end of the nineteenth century, only two other cities, 
Chicago and Jersey City, had launched similar initiatives.111  None of 
these early societies were started by bar associations, despite lofty 
rhetoric about preserving the integrity of the justice system for all.112  In 
the early 1900s, local bars began to establish some legal aid programs, 
and a handful of law schools opened clinics to serve the poor.113  The 
first such clinic, launched at the University of Denver Law School, was 
designed to provide practical training; by contrast, the student-initiated 
and student-run Harvard Legal Aid Bureau was a response to the dire 
legal needs of Boston’s poor.114   
These local efforts did not garner national attention until Reginald 
Heber Smith received funding from the Carnegie Foundation to study 
legal aid societies, which in turn led to publication of his pathbreaking 
book on Justice and the Poor.115  Smith, a Harvard Law School graduate 
from a well-to-do family, eventually worked with leading lawyer and 
former Supreme Court Justice Charles Evan Hughes to advance the 
cause of legal aid around the country.116  These efforts relied entirely on 
private philanthropy and met with only modest success.  Indeed, with a 
need to cultivate wealthy benefactors and to temper hostility from the 
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organized bar, the societies shied away from challenging substantial 
corporate interests that might harm the poor.117  Private efforts never 
produced enough attorneys to satisfy demand among the needy.  Even in 
1962, over forty years after Smith’s book was published, there were still 
“the equivalent of only 400 full-time legal aid lawyers . . . to represent 
over thirty-seven million low-income people . . . .”118  One significant 
stumbling block was “the failure of local bar associations to give 
leadership, and in many cases the hostility of lawyers to the idea,” which 
in turn was attributed to “unfounded fear of competition, inherent 
lethargy, or mere lack of interest.”119  The thinly realized rhetoric of 
social trusteeship was no match for concerns about the dynamics of the 
legal marketplace, which depended on generating revenue through client 
service. 
The failures of legal aid were only the most glaring example of the 
limits of social trustee professionalism.  At every turn, the rhetoric of 
public-regarding obligation met the reality of the market for legal 
services.  Indeed, the very notion of social trusteeship was born of the 
need to soften the implications of a new kind of elite expertise, the 
technical know-how to serve large corporate interests.  The ethical 
canons, aimed at lawyers who served the less fortunate, hardly touched 
the sheltered preserve in which a small cadre of influential lawyers 
served a similarly small enclave of wealthy clients.  These powerful 
interests could not be offended through activist interpretations of the 
public good.  And, so social trusteeship was equated with tending to the 
integrity of the administration of justice.  This focus on process 
reinforced the commitment to the formal neutrality of legal principles.  
The Harvardization of legal education was driven by similar dynamics.  
Students wanted practical skills, and conservative university trustees 
wanted to avoid high-profile controversies about public values.  Taken 
together, the legal profession and legal education offered a rather 
crimped understanding of social trustee professionalism that would be 
challenged during the next age of modern American lawyering.  The 
focus on preserving the integrity of courts and preparing students to 
grapple with judge-made law left the profession ill-prepared for the rise 
of the administrative state and the arrival of a new breed of government 
lawyer.   
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II. THE SECOND AGE OF MODERN AMERICAN LAWYERING: THE RISE 
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE AND THE ASSAULT ON LANGDELLIAN 
FORMALISM 
The second age of modern American lawyering arose in response 
to the New Deal and the growth of the administrative state.  Even before 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt began pursuing bold reforms in the 
late 1930s and early 1940s, a progressive movement had arisen that 
deployed law as a tool for social change.  Reflecting the newfound 
independence that Langdell had hoped for, law professors questioned a 
court-centered, scientific jurisprudence and insisted on more far-
reaching professional duties.  In 1906, William Draper Lewis of the 
University of Pennsylvania bemoaned the fact that the organized bar 
lacked a sense of obligation to the community and urged practitioners to 
look to “the administration of justice in its broadest sense.”120  Lewis 
believed that law schools had a special responsibility to train students to 
deal with affairs of state by including more public law in the 
curriculum.121  During this period, Roscoe Pound advocated that law be 
used for “social engineering” and led “the revolt against formalism” that 
culminated in the rise of legal realism; later, he retreated from these 
views when he became dean of Harvard Law School.122  In 1911, Yale 
professor William R. Vance bemoaned the bar’s conventionality and its 
resistance to placing social concerns ahead of client interests.123  In fact, 
among practicing lawyers, groundbreaking advocate and later Supreme 
Court Justice Louis Brandeis stood out both for his receptivity to 
considering the general good as “counsel for the situation” and for his 
endorsement of an activist role for faculty.124  A few law schools acted 
on this progressive vision.  The University of Wisconsin pioneered 
efforts to train government administrators and began to advise state 
officials on policy questions.  The Wisconsin idea had considerable 
appeal to law professors, who imagined that their unique expertise would 
make them influential figures in public life.125 
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Using law as a tool for social change often turned on growing the 
government bureaucracy.  Bar leaders worried that administrative 
agencies could undermine judicial authority.  As early as 1916, Elihu 
Root wrote that:  “We are entering upon the creation of a body of 
administrative law quite different in its machinery, its remedies, and its 
necessary safeguards from the old methods of regulation by specific 
statutes enforced by the courts.”126  After acknowledging that “[t]here 
will be no withdrawal from these experiments,” Root warned that “the 
powers that are committed to these regulatory agencies, and which they 
must have to do their work, carry with them great and dangerous 
opportunities of oppression and wrong.  If we are to continue a 
government of limited powers, these agencies of regulation must 
themselves be regulated.”127   
A. The Rise of the New Deal and the Anxiety of the Organized Bar 
In the 1930s, the New Deal led to unprecedented growth in federal 
regulatory power and brought anxieties about a sprawling and 
uncontrolled bureaucracy to the fore.  Leading corporate lawyers saw the 
Roosevelt Administration’s reforms as a direct attack on the courts and 
the profession.  As one Chicago attorney put it, “[o]ur prime function is 
to implement the existing order.  Its sudden destruction . . . implies our 
own.”128  Despite this intensely felt opposition to New Deal reforms, 
ABA leaders felt the need to tread lightly in expressing their dissent.  For 
one thing, the public saw corporate lawyers as complicit in predatory 
practices and market manipulations that had precipitated the Great 
Depression and made the New Deal necessary.129  With some 
misgivings, in 1934 the ABA’s General Assembly authorized a New 
Deal committee with a broad charge to “study the effect of recent 
developments in national legislation and governmental policies, as 
affecting the rights and liberties of American citizens and the 
maintenance of the guarantees furnished by the United States 
Constitution.”130  The committee proved an ill-fated enterprise.  As a 
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result of substantive disagreements and personality conflicts, members 
wrote different draft reports, none of which could be accepted and 
submitted in final form.131  Despite calls to abandon the effort entirely, a 
new committee was appointed; it produced a majority report, a minority 
report, and a concurring memorandum.132  Ultimately, the ABA 
leadership had to bury the committee’s work because it offered nothing 
in the way of practical recommendations.133   
One year earlier, the ABA had charged the Committee on 
Administrative Law with the narrow task of evaluating “the adequacy 
and efficiency of the [government] machinery employed” rather than its 
purposes and constitutionality.134  Yet, this committee also had been 
hamstrung by divergent agendas.  Some solo practitioners demanded that 
the ABA denounce the use of non-lawyers in the administrative process 
as a way to preserve a growing market for licensed attorneys.135  Still 
others wanted to avoid any ABA action that would jeopardize their 
already established specialty practices before administrative agencies.136  
Corporate lawyers pushed to bring controversies back into the courts or 
at least to impose a quasi-judicial process on agencies.137  Faced with 
competing demands, the committee chair worried that a report to the 
General Assembly would expose a divided bar.  The ABA president 
apparently agreed, observing that “it would be a good break for [the 
chair] if he didn’t have any time to explain the report and if the report 
went through more as a formal practice” because “the most dangerous 
thing he could do is try to explain it.”138  Over some pointed dissent, the 
General Assembly ultimately approved the report, though New Dealers 
dismissed the calls for judicial review and quasi-judicial processes as a 
product of the ABA’s hostility to the Roosevelt Administration.139   
Ongoing skirmishes over leadership revealed the ABA’s dilemma 
in addressing New Deal reforms.  Some bar leaders wanted to take a hard 
line against any changes, while others wanted to adopt a relatively 
noncommittal stance as a hedge against uncertainty.140  Confronted with 
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the ABA’s wavering efforts to chart a middle course, members with 
strong views defected to create organizations of their own.  Elite 
corporate attorneys formed the National Lawyers’ Committee of the 
American Liberty League to contest the legality of federal agencies’ 
expanded authority.141  These attorneys made their hostility to the 
Roosevelt administration plain and openly counseled clients to defy 
government mandates as unconstitutional usurpations of power.142  By 
contrast, lawyers who supported New Deal programs saw the changes as 
an opportunity to reinvigorate the profession’s public-regarding 
obligations.  In late 1936, some of these attorneys founded the National 
Lawyers Guild as an alternative voice for the profession.143  The Guild 
rejected “the corporate law identity of the ABA” as well as “its active 
involvement in conservative politics.”144  Law professors joined liberal 
and radical attorneys to lead the effort; notably, the executive board 
included Charles Hamilton Houston, the African-American dean of 
Howard Law School, at a time when the ABA remained all-white.145  
The Guild primarily appealed to “low-income, low-status urban 
practitioners along the East and West coasts,”146 the very kind of lawyers 
that elite practitioners had seen as a threat to the profession during the 
first age of modern American lawyering. 
Though unanimous in rejecting the ABA’s leadership, Guild 
members agreed about little else.  Internal politics, especially clashes 
between liberal and radical factions, “prevented the guild from becoming 
the powerful counterweight to the ABA that its founders had 
envisioned.147  However, some local chapters launched innovative 
programs to provide neighborhood legal services to low- and middle-
income clients.148  These efforts were especially noteworthy, given the 
organized bar’s general indifference to problems of the needy.149  Law 
professor Karl Llewellyn had hoped that junior attorneys at large firms 
would staff legal services programs in Chicago on a pro bono basis as an 
antidote to the profession’s rampant individualism and insensitivity to 
community needs.150  Privately, he even considered proposing a tax on 
large firms to subsidize the services but did not pursue the idea, perhaps 
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because he concluded that partners were “so highly specialized in 
corporate work that they are out of touch with the little man’s need.”151 
Despite efforts to present a united front, schisms between elite and 
non-elite practitioners were becoming evident.  Confronted with a 
splintering of authority to speak on behalf of the profession, the ABA 
was able to reassert itself decisively only when the Roosevelt 
Administration tried to undermine the power and stature of the United 
States Supreme Court.152  The justices had struck down New Deal 
legislation by constitutionalizing a laissez-faire approach to economic 
rights, and government officials were determined to nullify the 
decisions.  To do that, President Roosevelt had to take on the “Four 
Horsemen,”153 the conservative wing of the Court that had persuaded 
Justice Owen Roberts to join them in blocking reforms.  Roosevelt’s 
Court packing plan proposed to add one new justice for each member 
who had served ten years and was over seventy years old.  By allowing 
Roosevelt to appoint six new justices, the plan would leave the 
Horsemen an outnumbered minority.154  In fighting this blatant attack on 
the Court’s legitimacy, the ABA was able to unite its membership in 
defense of the rule of law and the integrity of the judicial process.155  The 
ABA launched a vigorous campaign against Roosevelt’s plan, but the 
efforts became moot when one of the Horsemen announced his 
impending retirement and the crucial swing vote, Justice Roberts, 
changed tack on the constitutionality of New Deal programs.156  With 
Roberts’ defection, a majority of the justices supported the Roosevelt 
Administration’s reforms, the “switch in time that saved nine.”157   
B. Dueling Elites: Government Lawyers and the Corporate Bar 
The battle over the Court’s fate was short-lived, but the effects of 
shifting government power on the profession were long-lasting.  The 
expansion of federal power created a new avenue to elite status as a 
lawyer, one that challenged the exclusive prerogatives of the corporate 
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bar.158  Many Roosevelt Administration attorneys had previously been 
excluded from the most powerful corporate law firms because they were 
Jewish or Catholic.159  These attorneys had gone to elite law schools, but 
even when they excelled, they found their opportunities blocked at large 
firms in major cities.160  With the Roosevelt Administration recruiting 
attorneys to advance its ambitious reform agenda, some faculty at top 
schools encouraged their best Jewish and Catholic students to sign on.  
This entrée to practice was especially important for Jewish students who 
were clustered at the top of their law school classes but at the bottom of 
the urban bar.161   
The New Deal’s “plague of young lawyers”162 was steeped in the 
knowledge, skills, and values typical of leading law schools, and despite 
allegations that the freshly minted graduates were radical 
revolutionaries, they embraced American legalism, especially its 
preoccupation with process.  As a result, administrative agencies 
ultimately came to rely on notice-and-comment rulemaking, public 
hearings, and quasi-judicial tribunals.163  Though some of these gifted 
attorneys remained in public service, many left to establish firms 
devoted to regulatory practice or to join new administrative law practice 
groups at the elite firms that once had shunned them.164  If New York 
and Chicago were strongholds of the corporate bar, Washington, D.C. 
became home to influential firms specializing in administrative law and 
legislative lobbying.165  The New Deal gave birth to a cadre of elite 
lawyers who rivaled the corporate bar, a recalibration of power that 
 
 158. SHAMIR, supra note 19, at 78-80. 
 159. AUERBACH, supra note 17, at 185.  Blacks and women also faced barriers to 
inclusion, but the New Deal did little to rectify their limited opportunities.  Jerold S. Auerbach, 
Lawyers and Social Change in the Depression Decade, in THE NEW DEAL 133, 160 (John 
Braeman et al. eds. 1975) [hereinafter Auerbach, Lawyers and Social Change in the 
Depression Decade]. 
 160. AUERBACH, supra note 17, at 29, 184-86. 
 161. Id. at 184.  Felix Frankfurter at Harvard Law School, himself a rarity as a Jewish 
faculty member at a prestigious school, was an especially prominent source of referrals, but 
outstanding students also arrived from Yale and Columbia.  Id. at 169-70; CARRINGTON, 
supra note 154, at 523-24 (describing how Frankfurter’s New Deal proteges were referred to 
as the “Happy Hot Dogs”). 
 162. PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 2 (1982) (citing George Peek, an 
agricultural economist who headed the Agricultural Adjustment Administration during the 
Roosevelt Administration). 
 163. AUERBACH, supra note 17, at 221-24. 
 164. Id. at 226-28.  As Bruce Alan Murphy explained in his biography of Abe Fortas, 
there were “two camps of alumni from the Roosevelt era in 1946: those who labored further 
for a New Deal for the nation, and those who wanted a ‘new deal’ for themselves.”  BRUCE 
ALAN MURPHY, FORTAS 72 (1988). 
 165. CARRINGTON, supra note 154, at 539. 
2018] THREE AGES OF MODERN AMERICAN LAWYERING 477 
permitted Jews in particular to overcome barriers that had prevented 
them from converting academic credentials into law firm partnerships.166 
The struggle over the New Deal was rooted in the corporate bar’s 
resistance to a rival form of lawyering.  Given these concerns, one might 
have expected the ABA to revisit its code of professional conduct to 
address the ethics of government lawyering.  However, internal divisions 
over the implications of the rise of the administrative state made that 
approach impossible.  As a result, the rise of the New Deal “did not 
significantly alter lawyers’ degree of regulation (or non-regulation) by 
either legislation, the courts, or their bar associations.”167  Instead, the 
organized bar focused on conflicts of interest that arose when lawyers 
went through the “revolving door” of government service to work in 
private practice.  This approach minimized the comparative advantages 
of administrative lawyers when they left their official posts to compete 
with the corporate bar for business.168   
As early as 1908, the ABA had adopted Canon 6, which addressed 
an attorney’s duty to refrain from representing clients whose interests 
were in conflict with those of another client, in this case, the prior 
government employer, and to disclose any possible conflicts.169  That 
canon made no attempt to address a lawyer’s ethical obligations while in 
government service.170  In 1928, as the role of state agencies expanded 
during the Progressive era, the bar adopted Canon 36, which clarified 
that former government attorneys, including judges, should not accept 
employment if it related to matters previously handled in an official 
capacity.171  Even these admittedly modest strictures were criticized.  As 
Judge Irving Kaufman explained in a 1957 article, an unduly pharisaical 
application of the canons might discourage attorneys from undertaking 
public service and inhibit them from using specialized knowledge 
acquired as government officials.172   
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With the ABA unable to offer clear guidance on the ethical 
obligations of government lawyers, the legal academy could have 
stepped in to fill the gap.  However, the legal realist movement, which 
had inspired so many New Deal attorneys, failed to afford much 
direction because it mainly attacked the status quo.173  Without a clearcut 
model of legal professionalism, agency attorneys came to understand 
their role in terms of technical expertise, much as officials from other 
professional disciplines did.174  This turn from social trustee to expert 
professionalism went largely unnoticed because government work was 
automatically equated with service to the general public.  That glib 
equivalency ignored the ambiguities inherent in a political environment 
that made it difficult to discern who the client was, much less what the 
client’s needs and wishes were.  These uncertainties allowed government 
attorneys to wield considerable authority in making value judgments 
about the common welfare, a problem that persists to this day.175  Such 
wide-ranging discretion could not be readily cabined through a 
straightforward application of technical expertise.  As a result, the gap 
between value-making and expert professionalism sometimes led to 
“amoral instrumentalism.”176  As legal historian G. Edward White 
concluded, an emphasis on pragmatism and experience led to “a 
relativistic and experimentalist approach toward morals as well as 
toward other issues.”177  These lacunae in the government lawyer’s 
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professional identity cried out for guidance, but the bar had none to 
provide, given the distrust that divided the ABA and the Roosevelt 
Administration.   
C. Legal Realism, New Deal Activism, and the Triumph of Incremental 
Curricular Reform 
As the New Deal altered the balance of power between corporate 
and government lawyers, it also changed the relationship between the 
legal profession and the academy.  Law professors who played an active 
role in supporting the Roosevelt Administration exemplified Langdell’s 
desire for an independent academy even as they attacked formalism and 
pretensions to scientific method in adjudication.  Yale Law School was 
a hotbed of legal realism and New Deal activism, commitments that were 
a self-conscious intellectual revolt against Harvard’s octopus-like 
hegemony.  As historian Robert Gordon explains, 
Perhaps Harvard’s most important contribution to the development 
of Yale was to give it something solid to define itself by, a heavy 
successful father both to emulate and to hurl itself against in 
rebellion.  Harvard’s was a dogmatic tradition that inspired 
antidogmatism, a disciplinary isolation that inspired 
interdisciplinary experiment, a grave condescension and assumption 
of superiority that inspired the urge to ridicule and destroy.178   
Directly contradicting the case method, legal realists asserted that 
jurists do not discover law in a neutral and impartial way but instead are 
influenced by personal backgrounds, beliefs, and attitudes.179  Legal 
realism blurred the boundary between law and politics—both were 
interest-driven processes of negotiation and compromise—and so 
undercut the claim that the judicial process is inherently superior to 
legislative and administrative decision-making.180  A legal realist 
perspective bolstered the New Deal’s assault on the primacy of courts as 
the ultimate arbiters of legal principles.  The justices who blocked the 
Roosevelt Administration’s reforms could be impugned as captives of 
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their own outmoded and tendentious world-views: The Horsemen were 
riding into the apocalypse, rather than looking to the future.   
In the mid-1930s, as the rhetoric of legal realism wore thin at Yale, 
the New Deal presented a welcome opportunity to put theory into 
practice.181  Jerome Frank, an adjunct professor at Yale and member of 
the Roosevelt Administration, recruited many friends on the faculty for 
leadership positions at federal agencies.182  In 1934-35, eight of Yale 
Law School’s professors were “on part-time or full-time loan to the 
government.”183  As a result, the law school “became thoroughly 
identified in the public mind with the New Deal, to the perpetual 
consternation of many Yale College alumni.”184  Campus and law school 
administrators were forced to “spen[d] an inordinate amount of time 
fending off conservative complaints that Yale Law School was just an 
outpost of Roosevelt’s Red Revolution.”185  Nor were alumni alone in 
expressing this concern.  By 1939, “the Chicago Tribune illustrated a 
series about the school with a cartoon showing the Yale law faculty 
hoisting the hammer and sickle over the Sterling Law Building.  An 
accompanying story said students were more likely to read Karl Marx 
than William Blackstone.”186   
Given the high-profile controversy, it should come as no surprise 
that New Dealers on the Yale faculty alarmed and angered conservative 
academic colleagues.187  The tensions created an increasingly 
uncomfortable situation that tested the boundaries of both academic duty 
and academic freedom.  As New Dealers spent more time in Washington, 
D.C. and away from their academic posts, a number of them were denied 
appointments, threatened with loss of their teaching positions, or forced 
to resign.188  Reflecting on the difficulties, the President of Yale 
concluded that “law faculties tend to harbor relatively more men of 
leftward-leaning political tendencies than are found in academic groups 
generally.  It is at variance, I should say, with the prevailing trend in bar 
and bench and probably reflects the theoretical, as contrasted with the 
practice, attitudes of mind.”189  In reaching this conclusion, the 
President—wittingly or unwittingly—lent credence to Langdell’s notion 
that law faculty would be empowered to challenge the practicing bar’s 
conventions.  What Langdell might not have fully anticipated, however, 
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were the deep schisms that could emerge when attorneys and academics 
found themselves at loggerheads over the profession’s future.   
Despite the Chicago Tribune’s fear that Yale Law students were 
more likely to read Marx than Blackstone, changes in the law school 
curriculum as a result of the New Deal were quite modest.  Not 
surprisingly, given that Harvard’s dominance was predicated on 
Langdellian formalism, its faculty’s response to calls for curricular 
reform was tepid.  At a 1937 meeting of the Association of American 
Law Schools, Professor Sidney Post Simpson described an institution 
largely satisfied with its dominant pedagogy: “The curriculum of 
Harvard Law School was completely revised in 1877, and thereafter 
there were some changes made, some new courses put in, a few old ones 
taken out, although a law school course seems to be something like a 
person in the civil service—once it gets in, there it stays.”190  Even so, in 
1934, the faculty decided once again to reconsider the school’s course 
offerings.191  This decision was driven by growing student dissatisfaction 
with the case method and a bland selection of classes.192 
Simpson reported that upon careful consideration, the faculty had 
decided to devote the first two years of instruction to mandated courses 
so that students would be grounded in “the minimum basic requirements 
for a member of the bar.”193  Despite the New Deal’s transformative 
impact, Simpson noted that “there is no required instruction in public 
law at all.”194  Instead, the faculty preferred a wait-and-see attitude to 
determine whether “the answer is a course, in the second year in 
constitutional and administrative law, in the institutions of government, 
as every lawyer must know about them” or “a requirement of some 
degree of concentration in public law.”195  Rejecting the legal realist 
approach, Simpson remarked that Harvard’s curricular changes did not 
emphasize legal history or comparative law and jurisprudence, as some 
sister schools’ programs did.196  Nor was there a course on legal ethics, 
much less one on the unique ethical challenges facing government 
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lawyers, an omission for which there were “no apologies to make.”197  
As Simpson elaborated, 
[I]f I am sure of anything, it is that a formal course on Legal Ethics 
is not helpful in [transmitting the tradition of a learned and public 
profession] . . . or, in my judgment, in any other regard.  It may be a 
course on legal etiquette, which I think is unnecessary.  It may be a 
course in ‘how far a lawyer can safely go,’ which I believe to be 
pernicious.  It may be a course of hortatory moral instruction, which 
seems to me perfectly useless.  Or it may be a bar cram course on the 
Canons, which seems to me beneath the dignity of the university law 
school.198 
As Simpson’s remarks made abundantly clear, Langdellian 
formalism still carried the day at Harvard—which remained largely free 
of public law, jurisprudential theories, or even legal ethics.  Clearly, the 
educational octopus would not be growing new tentacles to reach the 
practice environments of an emerging breed of government lawyers. 
By contrast, both Yale and Columbia embarked on ambitious 
though unsuccessful curricular reform efforts.  As early as 1916, Yale 
considered a program of interdisciplinary study as well as courses in 
“administration and perfecting its methods of legislation.”199  This 
experiment proved premature, but Columbia launched a similar effort in 
1928.200  Reformers emphasized the importance of using the social 
sciences and empirical methods to train students for public service, and 
by 1932, Columbia had hired a number of faculty with expertise in 
disciplines like finance, economics, philosophy, and political science.201  
The call for curricular change split the faculty and alarmed the dean, who 
worried that any shift would undermine the law school’s standing as “a 
first-grade professional school” that trained students for private 
practice.202  The innovations at Columbia ultimately failed to take root, 
and some leading proponents decamped for Yale, where the reformist 
impulse persisted and would take on newfound relevance with the advent 
of the New Deal.203   
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At Yale, professors mainly expressed their support for legal realism 
by conducting empirical research on legal matters.204  As faculty 
returned from service in the Roosevelt Administration, they added 
upper-division electives that focused on various facets of administrative 
law.205  These new courses eventually found their way from elite law 
schools to less prestigious—even unaccredited—ones.206  The addition 
of electives did not fundamentally alter the core curriculum, however, 
prompting one New Dealer to offer a more ambitious vision. Jerome 
Frank believed that “clinical-lawyer” schools should be modeled on 
medical instruction.207  Directly contradicting Langdell’s hiring 
philosophy, Frank argued that law professors should have extensive 
practical experience.  This would enable them to use real and simulated 
legal problems to prepare students for professional life.208  Frank’s 
proposal gained little traction among his faculty allies at Yale, not just 
because they lacked practical experience themselves but also because 
they worried that the bar’s inherent conservatism would dampen 
creativity in legal research and teaching.209  Despite Frank’s call for 
practice-oriented instruction, most reform initiatives of the day focused 
on making the law school curriculum either more interdisciplinary, as 
was true at the University of Chicago, or more specialized, as was true 
at Northwestern.210 
During the second age of modern American lawyering, the 
organized bar once again struggled to preserve the image of a unified 
profession by suppressing the reality of pluralism in law practice.  
Earlier, the corporate bar had worked to conceal stratification and to 
marginalize urban practitioners who served poor, immigrant, and 
working-class clients.  With the arrival of the New Deal, bar leaders had 
to rebuff a competing source of legal authority: government lawyers at 
highly influential federal agencies.  During the first age of modern 
American lawyering, there had been considerable social and 
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professional distance between corporate lawyers and upstart urban 
practitioners.  During the second age, bar leaders and the new breed of 
government lawyer had much in common, even though they were locked 
in a power struggle.  Both were products of elite law schools and shared 
many professional values, most notably a commitment to legal process.  
As a result, government lawyers and the organized bar eventually were 
able to find common ground in a shared commitment to safeguarding the 
integrity of the courts and to regularizing the administrative process.   
The desire for a unified professional image led bar leaders to 
minimize differences in practice environments that challenged 
conventional notions about client representation.  In particular, 
government practice upset the assumption that lawyers can readily 
ascertain and advance client interests.  With multiple stakeholders and 
competing agendas, agency attorneys enjoyed considerable latitude to 
inject their own preferences into purportedly neutral and impartial 
decision-making on behalf of “the people.”211  If private lawyers’ 
independence came from having their own practices, the salaried 
government lawyer’s autonomy largely derived from the uncertainty of 
the client’s identity.  Instead of tackling this discrepancy, the bar ignored 
it, and government lawyers adopted a model of expert professionalism 
like that of other agency staff, an approach that did little to resolve the 
special ethical challenges facing government attorneys.  As a result, 
social trusteeship remained an underdeveloped concept, even as 
Roosevelt Administration lawyers boldly embarked on structural 
reforms that would transform American life and politics. 
The law school curriculum offered a similar picture of stasis in the 
face of major innovation in lawyering.  Although legal realism had 
offered provocative challenges to the conventional wisdom, this school 
of thought was less successful in producing affirmative frameworks to 
understand the implications of New Deal reforms.  Concerns about 
conservative backlash and the ongoing emphasis on placing students in 
private practice led to curricular changes that were decidedly 
incremental.  In the face of this inertia in the profession and the academy, 
the relationship between social trustee and expert professionalism 
remained unclear.  This uneasy coexistence produced paradoxical 
results.  Private lawyers who primarily sold their expertise in the 
marketplace insisted on their roles as social trustees in the service of an 
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amorphous public obligation.  Meanwhile, government lawyers who 
served an amorphous client known as the people insisted on their roles 
as impartial and objective experts.  The unsettled distinction between 
social trustee and expert professionalism was the price of preserving the 
image of a unified bar.  The third age of modern American lawyering 
would challenge this inherently unstable rapprochement by offering an 
entirely different account of an attorney’s service to clients and public-
regarding obligations. 
III. THE THIRD AGE OF MODERN AMERICAN LAWYERING: THE RISE OF 
CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE PUSH FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 
AND A PEDAGOGY OF DIVERSITY 
The third age of modern American lawyering emerged in the wake 
of World War II, forged in the segregated and unequal world of the 
African-American bar and historically black law schools.212  Excluded 
from elite legal circles and confronted with limited resources, the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP)’s Legal Defense and Education Fund (the Inc. Fund) worked 
with Howard Law School to launch a litigation campaign that would 
dismantle state-mandated segregation.  These crusading civil rights 
lawyers placed great faith in the law and its capacity to advance social 
change.  The success of their efforts inspired other forms of cause 
lawyering, led to the expansion of clinical legal education, and 
introduced diversity into law school student bodies.  Despite the original 
civil rights advocates’ deep commitment to consummate lawyering, the 
complexity of structural and systemic change led others to question this 
law-centric framework. 
A. Civil Rights: From Law-Centric Credo to Backlash from the Left 
and the Right 
The Inc. Fund’s campaign for civil rights was guided by a belief 
that law, particularly judge-made law, could catalyze broad social 
change.  As a result, attorneys were essential leaders in efforts to end 
state-mandated segregation of the races.213  The persistence of 
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segregation itself was a reminder of law’s past failures and profound 
power to subordinate blacks.214  The races remained separated in 
significant part because the United States Supreme Court had 
legitimated the “separate but equal” doctrine in Plessy v. Ferguson215 in 
1896, closing off efforts to reconstruct the South after the Civil War.  
Confronted with real separation but fictive equality, the Inc. Fund set 
about demonstrating that stark disparities between black and white 
educational institutions were unacceptable badges of racial inferiority.  
Along with challenges to disenfranchisement and discrimination in the 
criminal justice system, the NAACP pursued litigation to promote equal 
educational opportunity.  Early cases targeted graduate and professional 
programs, where any semblance of equality was hard to achieve given 
the high cost of quality instruction.216  After victories in dismantling 
segregation in higher education, Inc. Fund lawyers turned their attention 
to public elementary and secondary schools, a strategy that culminated 
in the Supreme Court’s 1954 landmark decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education,217 which unanimously held that separate schools are 
inherently unequal.   
Challenges to the Inc. Fund’s law-centric credo came when the 
justices temporized on matters of implementation.  In Brown II,218 the 
Court held that school integration should proceed “with all deliberate 
speed,” a gradualism that stymied meaningful progress.219  Despite this 
setback, the NAACP maintained its faith in law’s remedial possibilities, 
concluding in its 1963 annual report that: “There is only one way.  Those 
who believe that rights must be found in law and ultimately rest upon 
law must make a massive effort to use law to solve America’s race 
problem.”220  Despite an unwavering belief in law’s promise, the Inc. 
Fund received no meaningful help from the organized bar.  In contrast 
to the National Lawyers Guild, which had admitted black members from 
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its inception, the ABA did not do so until 1943, only eleven years before 
Brown was decided.  During the 1950s, the ABA largely ignored the 
NAACP’s campaign for civil rights, and by the 1960s, it still was 
maintaining a studied distance.221  Invoking a narrow view of social 
trusteeship obligations, ABA President Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote in 
1965 that “the prevailing view is that the Association must follow a 
policy of noninvolvement in political and emotionally controversial 
issues—however important they may be—unless they relate directly to 
the administration of justice.”222   
As the ABA sought to remain neutral on civil rights issues, bar 
associations in the South, including Powell’s home state of Virginia, 
moved to thwart Inc. Fund lawyers by invoking ethical canons against 
solicitation and barratry, the very provisions once used to undercut urban 
immigrant practitioners.223  Civil rights attorneys regularly held 
meetings with community members to inform them about the legal 
assistance available to bring school desegregation claims.224  As part of 
massive resistance to the Brown ruling, Southern bar associations 
asserted that the Inc. Fund’s outreach efforts were unethical forms of 
solicitation and demanded sanctions against the lawyers involved.225  
State courts agreed, handing down decisions that would have stifled 
efforts to enforce Brown in federal court.226  The United States Supreme 
Court put an end to this obstructionist strategy, finding that the 
NAACP’s activities qualified as protected forms of speech and 
association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.227  Yet, as 
Supreme Court historian Mark Tushnet has observed, the decision was a 
close one that could easily have gone the other way.228   
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The Court’s endorsement of the Inc. Fund’s outreach efforts paved 
the way for broad reconsideration of ethical restrictions on lawyers’ 
ability to compete on price and advertise.229  In a Virginia case, a couple 
challenged the state bar’s minimum fee schedules as an antitrust 
violation.  The bar responded that law was a learned profession, rather 
than a commercial enterprise, so there could be no improper restraint of 
trade.230  The United States Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that 
the fee schedule, far from being flexible and advisory, operated as a rigid 
floor on prices.231  Not long thereafter, attorneys at a legal clinic in 
Arizona sought to advertise their low-cost services.  The state bar argued 
that the “hustle of the marketplace” would “bring about 
commercialization,” “adversely affect the profession’s service 
orientation, irreparably damage the delicate balance between the 
lawyer’s need to earn and his obligation selflessly to serve,” and “tarnish 
the dignified public image of the profession.”232  Rejecting all of these 
arguments, the justices concluded that state bars could at most regulate 
false and misleading advertising.233  As legal scholar James Moliterno 
notes, by focusing exclusively on consumer protection, the Court’s 
“false advertising language . . . would now apply to lawyers and used car 
salesmen alike.”234  Ironically, then, instead of broadening the 
boundaries of the bar’s notions of social trustee professionalism, the civil 
rights movement actually strengthened a free-market approach to 
lawyering that elevated expert professionalism. 
The uncertain implications of the civil rights movement for social 
trusteeship were further complicated when activists called into question 
the primacy of law as a tool for social reform.  Lack of progress in 
enforcing school desegregation mandates led some African-American 
leaders to question the relevance of attorneys and courts.  As an 
alternative, grass-roots reformers demanded direct action through civil 
disobedience and organized protest.235  As legal studies scholar Thomas 
Hilbink explains, “From the [NAACP’s] perspective, the goal was to 
establish legal principles first and foremost—putting them at odds with 
activists who saw protest as not merely a way of establishing a principle, 
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but involving people in their own liberation and thus challenging a 
culture of oppression.”236  The tensions came to a head in the 1960s.  The 
Inc. Fund sought to establish clear boundaries for lawyers representing 
members of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) 
during voter registration drives in the South.  In particular, NAACP 
lawyers insisted that SNCC activists decline representation by the 
National Lawyers Guild, a demand that SNCC rejected.237  Instead, 
SNCC expressed concerns about the Inc. Fund’s reluctance to file suits 
to protect protestors’ rights and to defend those who were arrested.238   
At this point, the relationship between the NAACP and advocates 
of direct action had grown so tense that President John F. Kennedy 
thought it necessary to assemble an elite group of attorneys to manage 
racial unrest in the South. 239  The Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights 
Under Law (LCCRUL) was co-directed by two leading members of the 
organized bar: Bernard Segal, a Philadelphia attorney who would 
become the ABA’s president, and Harrison Tweed, a New York law firm 
partner and former president of the American Law Institute and the New 
York City Bar Association.240  Tweed insisted on adding “under law” to 
the committee’s name to make clear that the group was dedicated to legal 
process and condemned violence.241  As the nomenclature suggested, 
LCCRUL shared the Inc. Fund’s belief in the primacy of legal remedies, 
insisting that “the spectacle of repeated violations of law, actual or 
apparent, by those who are pressing the fight for civil rights is deeply 
troubling to many thoughtful persons who reject the notion that the end 
justifies the means . . . .”242  Initially, Segal and Tweed asked local 
lawyers in the South to represent activists, but when these efforts proved 
insufficient, LCCRUL sent attorneys there to give “ ‘ objective’ legal 
assistance without succumbing to the ‘emotionally-charged atmosphere 
of Freedom Summer.’ ” 243   
The eighteen lawyers who ultimately participated were to assist 
ministers from the National Council of Churches in their efforts to 
counter repressive tactics designed to suppress civil rights activism.  
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LCCRUL attorneys were limited to individual representation and were 
not to pursue impact litigation or other forms of advocacy.244  Yet, as 
these lawyers witnessed the realities of segregation and massive 
resistance, they chafed at the restrictions.  The most outspoken critics of 
LCCRUL’s policies on lawyering were derided as “going SNCC,” but 
in fact, many of these attorneys came to conclude that 
their value [should be measured] not in terms of legal victories won 
or representation provided.  Rather, lawyers saw their presence as 
the value.  Their presence—in the streets, in COFO [Council of 
Federated Organizations] Freedom Houses, in jails, in courtrooms—
played a role in deterring white Southerners, and particularly state 
actors, from meting out greater violence and lawlessness against the 
movement.245   
Like other attorneys who subsequently identified as cause lawyers, 
these LCCRUL lawyers saw their place in social movements as distinct: 
Law was one among many tools for reform, lawyers had to collaborate 
with clients, and there was no bright line between law and politics.246 
In the wake of the civil rights movement, other cause lawyers 
successfully employed a combination of litigation, lobbying, and grass-
roots activism in the 1960s and 1970s, in part because they came to enjoy 
at least grudging recognition from the bar.247  This acceptance was 
motivated by a “crisis of professionalism” prompted by the slow pace of 
desegregation, the skullduggery of high-ranking attorneys in the Nixon 
administration during the Watergate scandal, and strong opposition 
among rank-and-file bar members to creation of a national legal services 
program.248  As historian Jerold S. Auerbach explains, these lapses in 
social responsibility made attorneys seem like nothing more than hired 
guns and left the ABA on the wrong side of history.249  Faced with these 
pressing challenges, bar leaders recognized the importance to their 
professional standing of embracing law as an instrument of social 
reform.   
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B. Legal Services: From the War on Poverty to the War on Lawyers 
To address growing cynicism about the legal profession’s 
leadership and vision, ABA President Lewis Powell, Jr. worked in the 
mid-1960s to craft a compromise that would win support for the 
fledgling legal services program in the Office of Economic Opportunity 
(OEO).250  Originally part of President Lyndon Baines Johnson’s War 
on Poverty, OEO had been perceived as a threat to private legal aid 
societies as well as solo and small firm practices.251  Powell addressed 
these fears by offering ABA support only if OEO permitted existing 
legal aid societies to receive government funding, allowed bar 
representatives to have a role in governance, and respected traditional 
norms of professionalism.252  Powell’s compromise made the 
independent judgment of lawyers non-negotiable, and professional 
autonomy became a hallmark of the ABA’s subsequent support for legal 
services, even as the program confronted intense political backlash.253 
Inherent contradictions in the understanding of the lawyer’s 
professional role became evident.  While the ABA insisted that lawyers 
be able to exercise independent judgment, critics decried legal services 
attorneys who pursued larger social agendas rather than subordinating 
themselves to their clients’ immediate interests.254  There were proposals 
to limit any class action litigation, legislative advocacy, or media 
campaign that was not done at the specific behest of a low-income 
client.255  Other reforms called for restrictions on lawsuits against 
national, state, and local officials, suggesting that loyalty really ran to 
the government (which at the federal level was paying the bills), rather 
than to the poor.256  The ABA’s response was simple: legal services 
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attorneys must be free to represent low-income clients on the same terms 
as those who served paying clients.257  But this response obscured 
underlying ambiguities about the lawyer’s role.  Some of these 
uncertainties related to whether social trusteeship should figure at all in 
the representation or whether lawyers should apply their expertise 
narrowly to do their clients’ bidding.  For those who did embrace social 
trusteeship, there were doubts about how broadly it should be construed 
and, in particular, whether it should encompass broad attacks on the 
structural conditions of poverty as well as the particular hardships it 
created for individual clients. 
In part because of these ongoing uncertainties, the ABA could not 
deflect a divisive struggle over the proper reach of legal services.258  At 
the outset, the legal services program was part of a comprehensive effort 
to eradicate poverty, and it seemed both logical and necessary that 
attorneys would pursue fundamental change.  Later, though, when OEO 
was dismantled and legal services became an independent organization, 
its mission shifted to access to justice.259  As then-President of the Legal 
Services Corporation Thomas Ehrlich explained, “legal assistance for 
the poor is no longer part of a war against poverty.  Rather that assistance 
is established as a basic right of citizenship.”260  Due to limited funding, 
this right was framed as one of minimum access with an aspiration for 
adequate or even equal access at some unspecified later date.261  That 
hope was never realized; instead, there were perennial debates about 
what the bare minimum of legal representation for indigent clients 
required.262  The shift to an access to justice mission helped to cement a 
view of the program as one designed to meet client needs, and legal aid 
lawyers were banned from filing class actions to pursue broad-based 
reforms.263  As a consequence, structural reform efforts had to find a 
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home elsewhere in non-profit public interest law firms, small and solo 
firms, large firm pro bono programs, and government practice.  Each of 
these practice environments influenced the nature of the lawyering: 
Often, those workplaces with the most resources pursued the least 
controversial cases, while those with the fewest resources struggled to 
support more radical conceptions of reform.264  Increasing reliance on 
pro bono services, which eventually outpaced legal aid in meeting the 
needs of the poor, placed primary responsibility with private law firms 
and so further instantiated a traditional model of lawyering.265 
Innovations during the first two ages of modern American 
lawyering proved quite durable, in part because they came to enjoy the 
support of institutional elites.  Changes wrought by the third age, 
however, proved more vulnerable to retrenchment, in part because they 
reflected the efforts of outsiders who were profoundly marginalized.  
Attacks on legal aid began in earnest in the 1980s with the election of 
President Ronald Reagan.266  His administration’s ideological 
skirmishes were waged in the name of government downsizing and cost-
cutting but often reflected a deep hostility to the redistributive 
consequences of structural reform.  As the organized bar sought to 
assimilate legal services to conventional lawyering, the Reagan 
Administration’s attacks on the program put the ABA on the defensive.  
In 1987, Clark Durant, then chair of the Legal Services Corporation 
board, created an uproar at an ABA mid-year meeting when he argued 
that legal services funding should be zeroed out because the entire legal 
profession needed to be restructured.267  In Durant’s view, the monopoly 
on legal services had to be broken by lifting restrictions on the 
unauthorized practice of law and by doing away with educational and 
licensing requirements for lawyers.268  As he explained, “[t]he greatest 
barrier to widely dispersed low-cost dispute resolution services for the 
poor, and for all people, could very well be the laws protecting our 
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profession.”269  To break up cartel-like practices, Durant urged “a private 
sector deregulated legal profession” that would “encourage at every turn 
the ability of entrepreneurs, para-professionals and lay people to be a 
part of the delivery of legal services to the poor and for all people.”270  
This open attack on the profession’s identity prompted a sharp rebuke 
from the ABA, which called for Durant’s resignation as board chair.271   
In contrast to populist reforms advocated during the Jacksonian era, 
Durant’s proposals were the product of elite resistance to cause 
lawyering.  In the end, a combination of conservative political 
ascendancy and powerful market forces took a toll on the alliance 
between the practicing bar and progressive cause lawyers.  According to 
socio-legal scholars Stuart Scheingold and Austin Sarat, 
As the broader political culture became more conservative after 
1980, as the market for legal services became more competitive, and 
as moral advocacy lost its luster for most young lawyers, the 
profession’s receptivity to cause lawyering diminished.  At the level 
of the firm, . . . bottom-line concerns eroded support for cause 
lawyering, with its tendency to eat into billable hours and sap the 
energies of young associates.  As for the organized profession, it 
continued to call for vigorous pro bono programs and to support 
government-funded legal services.272 
Bar leaders’ exhortations at best produced mixed results.  Legal 
services suffered severe setbacks, and firms implemented their pro bono 
programs in ways that deflected the most radical implications of cause 
lawyering.273   
Efforts to dismantle legal services represented a frontal assault on 
cause lawyering.  More subtle were efforts to appropriate lawyering 
innovations to advance conservative causes.  As legal scholar Ann 
Southworth notes, “in the late 1960s, the public interest movement was 
almost synonymous with left legal activism. . . .”274  By the 1970s, 
however, right-wing legal groups had begun to emerge and found 
themselves “at war” over goals and strategies; indeed, the infighting 
prompted the conservative Heritage Foundation to intervene and counsel 
cooperation.275  In the late 1970s, attorney Michael Horowitz obtained 
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funding to study conservative legal advocacy organizations.  He found 
that “what is at stake in public interest law is not so much a battle over 
cases won and lost as of ideas and ideologies.”276  Horowitz concluded 
that for right-wing legal organizations to become an authentic 
movement, they had to demonstrate that “the real interests of America’s 
poor and vulnerable inhere in such goals as abatement of inflation, 
enhanced economic productivity, restraint on the power of government 
and the courts, and growth of such ‘middle class’ values as the work 
ethic, education, [and] effective criminal prosecution . . . .”277  To that 
end, he urged these organizations to recruit talented young attorneys and 
to abandon their narrow focus on litigation and amicus briefs.  In 
particular, he exhorted the groups to seek influence in the policy process, 
both in the legislative and executive arenas.278  Ironically, these broad 
tools for effecting social change were the very ones that the Reagan 
administration had sought to strip from legal aid lawyers. 
Reagan’s presidency ushered in a proliferation of conservative 
advocacy groups, which enjoyed a newfound receptivity in the highest 
circles of government.279  That growth continued into the 2000s.280  
Though meant to appropriate the public interest rhetoric of the left, the 
rise of conservative legal advocacy organizations also complicated 
notions of professionalism.  Legal scholars Stuart Scheingold and Austin 
Sarat have argued that “[t]he place of cause lawyering in the profession 
remain[ed] conditional and precarious” because it “directly assail[ed] the 
profession’s core standard of ethical behavior, which weds lawyering to 
political and moral neutrality and to technical competence.”281  The 
emergence of robust conservative legal organizations arguably showed 
that even the lawyering innovations of the civil rights movement could 
be treated as a refinement of expertise in the service of clients’ interests.  
With cause lawyers on both the left and the right, lawyering itself 
remained a neutral concept—equally available to advance competing 
ideologies.  This neutrality in turn revealed the underlying incoherence 
of social trustee professionalism as the notion of the public good became 
fodder for an increasingly partisan adversarial process.282 
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C. Making It Real: Cause Lawyering and the Growth of Clinical 
Education 
The legal academy played a significant role in the third age of 
modern American lawyering.  The Inc. Fund had worked closely with 
Howard Law School, especially its dean Charles Hamilton Houston, to 
develop a litigation strategy that would dismantle the “separate but 
equal” doctrine.  Houston was a seminal figure who devised plans of 
legal attack, mentored protégés to lead the effort, and designed a 
curriculum to prepare graduates for the rigors of practice.  As one of the 
few black students at Harvard Law School, Houston used his experience 
with the educational octopus to inform his deanship at Howard.283  
African-Americans were largely barred from elite white law schools, but 
Houston believed that historically black law schools with high 
expectations and excellent training could prepare students for effective 
advocacy on behalf of their communities.284  As he explained, “There are 
enough white lawyers to care for the ordinary legal business of the 
country if that were all that was involved.  But experience has proved 
that the average white lawyer, especially in the South, cannot be relied 
upon to wage an uncompromising fight for equal rights for Negroes.”285   
In the 1930s Houston worked to turn Howard Law School into a 
challenging academic institution like Harvard.  There would no longer 
be a part-time night school, and the day program would raise admissions 
standards, strengthen the curriculum, and make more demands on the 
faculty.286  By 1950, Houston had achieved many of his ambitious goals 
and was training a substantial portion of the black lawyers in the United 
States.  A number of these alumni worked as affiliates or employees of 
the Inc. Fund.287  Thurgood Marshall, a Houston protégé who became a 
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prominent civil rights litigator and a justice of the United States Supreme 
Court, recalled: “When Brown against the Board of Education was being 
argued in the Supreme Court . . . [t]here were some two dozen lawyers 
on the side of the Negroes fighting for their schools . . . . [O]f those . . . 
lawyers . . . only two hadn’t been touched by Charlie Houston. . . .”288 
As part of the effort to elevate Howard, Houston asked law faculty 
to lead by example.  He recruited active civil rights practitioners who 
brought their practical experience into the classroom.  In Houston’s own 
courses, he drew on materials from the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) as well as the NAACP so that students would understand the 
challenges of broad-ranging reform advocacy.289  Designed to address 
the needs of black lawyers, the curriculum reflected “a difference in 
emphasis with more concentration on the subjects having direct 
application to the economic, political and social problems of the 
Negro.”290  In addition to a civil rights focus, Howard’s course offerings 
relied on practical exercises to train students in everything from drafting 
real estate documents to working in the criminal justice system.291  Top 
students like Marshall even had opportunities to participate in cases that 
the Inc. Fund was litigating.292  This intensive hands-on instruction was 
designed to enable Howard Law alumni to overcome limited 
opportunities for professional development as well as the pitfalls of 
discrimination.   
Innovation associated with the third age of modern American 
lawyering led to lasting change with the growth of clinical education.293  
Demands for more practical training in law school were hardly new.  In 
1928, Alfred Z. Reed recommended such courses to little avail.294  
During the New Deal, Jerome Frank pressed for real-life legal 
laboratories, but his efforts also gained little traction.295  In fact, by 1951 
there were only twenty-eight law school clinics in the United States.296  
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From the outset, the rationale for experiential learning was far from 
monolithic.  Reed had envisioned a two-track system that relegated the 
practically trained to mundane careers.  Clinics would promote the 
mastery of expertise that could be sold on the market; there was no 
notion that skills training should advance social change.  By contrast, 
“for the greats of Realism, practical training was primarily for the 
purpose of deepening theoretical understanding.” 297  Realists believed 
that students need[ed] to be exposed to the ‘law in action’ in order to 
become sensitive to the impact of the law on the world and the impact of 
the world on law, so that they would reflect on their own future roles and 
not view law as a self-contained ‘science’ divorced from reality.”298  
Reflecting an expansive concept of social trustee professionalism, 
clinics would teach students that “an important part of their future task 
is to press for improvements of the judicial process and for social and 
economic changes through legislation, and wise administration . . . .”299   
With a strong social justice focus, the model of clinical education 
that initially emerged during the third age of modern American 
lawyering owed more to the Realists’ vision than Reed’s.300  Early on, 
the OEO itself had recognized the potential for legal educators to become 
partners in the War on Poverty.  Officials sought funding to link legal 
aid attorneys to law schools so that advocacy for the poor could be 
supported by high-quality research and well-trained attorneys.301  This 
partnership was never realized; instead, some post-graduate fellowships 
were created to encourage young lawyers to work for legal services.302 
Even a grant to support the Harvard Legal Services Institute, a single 
initiative at a single law school, met with withering criticism and federal 
funding was terminated.303   
Without public funding, law school clinics relied on private seed 
money from the Ford Foundation to expand.  Ford appointed William 
Pincus to head the Council on Legal Education for Professional 
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Responsibility (CLEPR), a post he held from 1968 to 1981.304  These 
efforts were transformative: By the early 1970s half of all American law 
schools had at least one clinical program.305  In explaining this dramatic 
shift, Pincus described himself as “a child of the Roosevelt era”306 who 
recognized the importance of a new era of social activism.  In his view, 
“[t]he outside forces which helped CLEPR’s program and served also to 
open the law schools to change included the black man’s fight for 
advancement; various kinds of student action; and the legal services 
programs which came as a result of the war on poverty.”307  He believed 
that “[l]aw student unrest in the late 60’s, . . . minor as it was compared 
to the other student unrest, found the law faculties shaky enough to be 
ready to make some concessions.”308  As a result, law school clinics 
emerged from “a marriage of convenience between law schools, a 
vanguard of law students and young law professors, and CLEPR.”309  
Pincus was not always entirely comfortable with the union.  When 
invited to be part of a discussion on “Young Lawyers and the Legal 
Revolution,” he remarked that “I doubt that what we at the Council on 
Legal Education for Professional Responsibility are trying to bring about 
can be termed a revolution.  We are trying to reform the law school 
curriculum. . . .”310 
In its early years, CLEPR “justified clinical education in terms of 
community service.”311  This orientation led to concerns that the 
educational mission was being shortchanged.312  In a May 1971 report, 
CLEPR acknowledged the tensions: 
It was felt that if clinical programs continue to restrict themselves to 
small numbers of students, they are likely to court the disapproval of 
the outside world particularly as they involve themselves in highly 
sensitive cases.  If the entire student body of the law school is 
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involved, then descriptions in terms of ‘educational’ rather than 
‘agitational’ are more likely to be applied.313 
These tensions led to competing approaches—ranging from 
partnerships with legal aid offices and live-client clinics that fulfilled a 
social justice mission to field placements and simulations that focused 
on skills training as preparation for practice.314   
The conflict eventually was resolved largely in favor of skills 
training.  By 1974, George S. Grossman, who conducted research on 
clinical programs for CLEPR, concluded that “[a] new consensus is 
emerging, basing the rationale of the clinical method not on service, not 
on law reform, not on research results, but on education.”315  The 
personal experience of clinicians confirmed this shift.  Professors Philip 
G. Schrag and Michael Meltsner arrived at Columbia Law School as 
clinics were being “born in the social ferment of the 1960s.”316  Initially, 
their clinical offerings were designed to address questions of social 
justice but as the civil rights and antiwar protests of an earlier era faded 
into distant memories, students were “quite content with the view that 
social issues—particularly questions of income and wealth 
distribution—are personal concerns, unrelated to their career decisions 
within the profession. . . .”317  In response, their clinics gradually came 
to focus on skills training, and Schrag and Meltsner dropped subjects 
like criminal justice reform, campaign practices, and immigration, 
instead creating simulations that were more manageable and easier to 
teach. 318  The changes eventually aligned clinical instruction more 
closely with traditional notions of lawyering.  As Schrag and Meltsner 
explain, “[t]he comparative neutrality of our present role tend[ed] to 
convey an approval of good lawyering divorced from its social 
impact. . . .”319  Despite this shift, they still believed that their pioneering 
efforts made “[l]aw schools . . . generally more hospitable places for 
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teachers and students interested in law reform and social service than 
they were when we started teaching more than twenty-five years ago.”320   
Just as the third age’s innovation of cause lawyering proved 
unstable and subject to retrenchment, so too did clinical education with 
a social justice orientation.  According to legal scholar William Simon, 
as skills training became narrowly focused on the client’s interests, it 
was shorn of historical and social context. This seeming neutrality 
cultivated “a sense of apolitical moral engagement” that celebrates “an 
ahistorical and apolitical conception of human nature.”321  More 
recently, clinician Sameer Ashar has voiced similar concerns about the 
lost democratic promise of clinical education.322  In his view, even live-
client clinics now rely heavily on an individual case-centered model, 
which reinforces conventional practice norms.323  Ashar believes that 
law schools have come to privilege pedagogy over social justice by 
marginalizing community-based, progressive lawyering.324  With the 
latest economic downturn in the legal market, he argues, there are 
increasing pressures to prepare students for traditional legal careers. 325  
As a result, clinical lawyering for social justice has been forced to cede 
even more curricular space to practical training.326  Rather than 
transforming the traditional curriculum, then, clinical education has 
itself been assimilated to conventional pedagogies. 
D. Desegregation, Affirmative Action, and the Compromised Pedagogy 
of Diversity 
Calls for social justice in law schools affected not just the 
curriculum but the composition of the student body: women and people 
of color enrolled in unprecedented numbers beginning in the late 1960s 
and 1970s.  As early as 1938, NAACP lawyers had successfully 
challenged policies that excluded blacks from public law schools.327  In 
Sweatt v. Painter,328 decided just a few years before Brown, the Supreme 
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Court struck down Texas’s establishment of a separate and clearly 
inferior law school for African-American students.  At the time that 
Sweatt was decided, African Americans accounted for only about .65 
percent of the legal profession, and segregation was the norm, not the 
exception, in legal education.329  The opinion in Sweatt acknowledged 
these stark realities, noting that “[t]he law school, the proving ground for 
legal learning and practice, cannot be effective in isolation from the 
individuals and institutions with which the law interacts.”330 
Despite the victory in Sweatt, law schools remained 
overwhelmingly white until the late 1960s.331  In the 1964-65 academic 
year, for example, only 1.3 percent of law students were African-
American, and that figure fell to less than one percent after excluding 
students enrolled at historically black institutions.332  The data for 
Latinos is sketchier; however, research suggests that by 1969, fewer than 
.006 percent of all law students were part of an “amorphous category 
entitled Spanish American, which includes all Spanish surnames and 
Spanish speaking groups.”333  The statistics on Native Americans are 
similarly scant, but in 1968, there were no more than twenty-five Native 
American attorneys in the United States.334  In part, this slow progress 
reflected a philosophy of gradualism in implementing desegregation.  In 
1955, for example, the AALS rejected the Committee on Racial 
Discrimination’s recommendation that law schools refrain from 
discriminating against black applicants or lose their membership.335  
AALS leaders concluded that “any coercive measures would delay 
further racial integration in the schools by aggravating present 
resentment and resistance” and therefore “[t]he wisest course . . . is for 
the Association to continue to serve in the role of mediator . . . .”336   
The rise of cause lawyering made plain the gap between the 
identities of lawyers and members of the communities that they served.  
When the War on Poverty was launched, the scarcity of lawyers of color 
was so acute that officials at OEO’s legal services program worried 
about “funding a nearly all-white program.”337  To address that concern, 
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OEO lawyers helped to launch the Council on Legal Educational 
Opportunity (CLEO), an initiative of the ABA, the AALS, and the 
historically black National Bar Association.  Funded by the Ford 
Foundation, CLEO was a pipeline program designed to help talented 
students of color pursue law degrees.338  Affirmative action programs, 
created in response to riots in 1967 and 1968 that followed the 
assassination of civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.,339 
produced substantial gains in law school enrollment for blacks, Latinos, 
and Native Americans, especially in the 1970s.340  During that period, 
women also entered law schools in unparalleled numbers, despite some 
initial resistance.341  In 1965, female students made up four percent of 
enrollments, but by 1980, they accounted for thirty-six percent of all law 
students.342 
With this remarkable demographic shift, some legal educators 
anticipated that diversity itself would transform classroom dynamics so 
that questions of inequality and inclusion could come to the fore.  That 
notion had figured in Sweatt’s assertion that law schools were less 
effective when isolated from the communities they serve.  A similar 
philosophy influenced the United States Supreme Court’s endorsement 
of affirmative action programs in 1978 in Bakke v. Regents of the 
University of California.343  There, Justice Lewis Powell emphasized 
that student body diversity was critical to promote “the robust exchange 
of ideas.”344  In 2003, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed this 
view in Grutter v. Bollinger,345 when it upheld the consideration of race 
and ethnicity in admissions at the University of Michigan Law School.  
The Court saw elite law schools as pathways to influence that must be 
open to people from all walks of life.  A diverse student body would 
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Dean Erwin Griswold reportedly greeted the incoming class by saying “Enjoy your stay at 
Harvard Law School, and as for the women in the class, personally, I didn’t favor your 
admission, but since you are here, welcome.”  John Anderson, Admission Denied, AM. LAW., 
Mar. 1999, at 118, 119.   
 342. OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS, ABA AND LAW SCHOOL 
ADMISSION COUNCIL 808 (Wendy Margolis et al. eds. 2001).  By 2000, women had achieved 
parity in law school enrollments.  Id. 
 343. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Powell, J., majority).   
 344. Id. at 312 (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). 
 345. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
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enrich the intellectual environment by better preparing all students to 
serve clients, understand the profession’s public-regarding obligations, 
and assume leadership roles in a multicultural society.346  In 2016, in 
Fisher v. Texas, the justices again embraced a pedagogy of diversity as 
a justification for affirmative action.347 
Despite the Court’s pronouncements, survey research and anecdotal 
evidence suggest that members of underrepresented racial and ethnic 
groups often are marginalized in classes that elevate technical doctrine 
over values rooted in personal experience.  As legal scholar Elizabeth 
Mertz found in her study of first-year Contracts classes, the case 
method’s dominance has led to a “constant filtering of conflict stories 
through the lens of legal-textual authority” and has taught students to 
acquiesce in the ways that legal discourse “operate[s] to reinforce social 
inequality, while essentially hiding its own tracks.”348  Even today, the 
Langdellian method socializes law students to treat as unnameable or at 
least irrelevant the very differences that diversity is designed to 
illuminate. 
Women and people of color often feel alienated by the law school 
curriculum, as demonstrated by consistent findings that they are less 
likely to speak in class than their white male peers.349  Researchers 
attribute these differences not only to traditional teaching methods in the 
first-year curriculum but also a significant lack of diversity on law school 
faculties and in the student body.350  Typically, only a handful of upper-
division electives concentrate on the unique experiences of women and 
people of color, while the rest of the curriculum remains largely free of 
 
 346. Id. at 328-33. 
 347. Fisher v. Texas (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417-18 (2013); Fisher v. Texas (Fisher 
II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2210-11 (2016) (Fisher II).   
 348. MERTZ, supra note 78, at 94, 98 (2007); see also ROBERT GRANFIELD, MAKING 
ELITE LAWYERS 52-65 (1992) (students shift from idealism to cynicism because of the first-
year curriculum’s gamesmanship). 
 349. See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Kenneth B. Nunn, & Jane E. Pendergast, Diversity 
Matters: Race, Gender, and Ethnicity in Legal Education, 15 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 11, 
22, 23, 26, 34 (2003); LANI GUINIER, ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN 43 (1997); Suzanne 
Homer & Lois Schwartz, Admitted but Not Accepted: Outsiders Take an Inside Look at Law 
School, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 28-29 (1990); Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The 
Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1299, 1335 (1988).  But cf. Gender, 
Legal Education, and the Legal Profession: An Empirical Study of Stanford Law Students and 
Graduates, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1242-43 (1988) (women participated less in class than 
men, but this pattern did not affect their satisfaction with or performance in law school).  See 
generally Elizabeth Mertz et al., What Difference Does Difference Make? The Challenge for 
Legal Education, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 16-32 (1998) (reviewing studies on race and gender 
in the classroom). 
 350. See, e.g., GUINIER ET AL., supra note 349, at 48, 49-51, 53-54, 58-62; Dowd, Nunn, 
and Pendergast, supra note 349, at 30-33, 36-39; Mertz et al., supra note 349, at 3-4; Homer 
& Schwartz, supra note 349, at 37-38, 45. 
2018] THREE AGES OF MODERN AMERICAN LAWYERING 505 
discussions of race and gender.351  Despite these shortcomings, law 
students overwhelmingly endorse the value of diversity in legal 
education.  In a study done at Harvard and Michigan shortly before the 
Grutter decision, education scholars Gary Orfield and Dean Whitla 
reported that approximately eighty percent of surveyed law students 
supported strengthening or maintaining admissions policies to promote 
inclusion of underrepresented minorities.352  Students reported that 
contact with people of different races and ethnicities enhanced their 
ability to work in interracial settings, improved the educational 
experience, and prompted them to rethink their values and perspectives 
on issues like civil rights and criminal justice.353   
The third age of modern American lawyering once again failed to 
grapple with the implications for social trusteeship of a major innovation 
in practice, cause lawyering.  The bar wanted to preserve a unified 
image, but this time, the threat came from newly prominent black 
lawyers who had once been barred from joining the ABA.  Their 
segregated status was undeniable proof of the profession’s stratification, 
and this reality was harder to deflect through largely rhetorical 
commitments to social trusteeship.  Initially, the NAACP’s law-centric 
credo offered at least some common ground—all could agree that 
technical mastery was essential to consummate lawyering.  Yet, even 
this shared understanding rooted in expert professionalism was 
destabilized by activists who insisted on political mobilization as a vital 
tool for reform.  To restore some tenuous sense of professional solidarity, 
the bar turned to legal aid services and demanded that attorneys 
representing the poor enjoy the same autonomy as those serving paying 
clients.  This move helped to legitimate a conventional model of legal 
service delivery, even as federal officials stripped legal aid attorneys of 
their most compelling techniques for effecting social change.  The 
emphasis was on deploying expertise to serve client interests, while 
obligations to serve the greater good remained peripheral and ill-defined.   
Conventional notions of mastery and expertise also worked to 
temper the impact of cause lawyering on American law schools.  Clinical 
education was adapted to provide practical skills training, rather than to 
promote a social justice mission.  Similarly, diversity became a means 
to prepare students to represent clients and deal with colleagues in a 
multicultural society, not an opportunity to reassess the social and ethical 
obligations of a changed profession.  In short, expert professionalism 
 
 351. Faisal Bhabha, Toward a Pedagogy of Diversity in Legal Education, 52 OSGOODE 
HALL L.J. 59, 86-90 (2014).   
 352. Gary Orfield and Dean Whitla, Diversity and Legal Education: Student Experiences 
in Leading Law Schools, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED 147 (G. Orfield ed. 2001).   
 353. Id. at 155-67. 
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continued to anchor the bar’s unified identity and to tether the evolution 
of social trustee professionalism.  These repeated failures to elaborate 
the public-regarding aspects of law set the stage for the current crisis in 
the legal profession and legal education, one marked by fears of 
destructive market forces and declining aspirational ideals. 
IV. THE CURRENT CRISIS: ARE WE ENTERING THE FOURTH AGE OF 
MODERN AMERICAN LAWYERING? 
As the social activism of the 1960s and 1970s receded and anxieties 
about commercialism grew, an elegiacal literature on the decline of law 
as a public-regarding profession—always with at least some hope of 
redemption—began to appear.  In his 1993 book The Lost Lawyer, 
former Yale Law School dean Anthony T. Kronman described a crisis 
of morale due to “the demise of an older set of values that until quite 
recently played a vital role in defining the aspirations of American 
lawyers.  At the very center of these values was the belief that the 
outstanding lawyer—the one who serves as a model for the rest—is not 
simply an accomplished technician but a person of prudence or practical 
wisdom as well.”354  In a similar vein, Robert MacCrate, a New York 
law firm partner and a strong proponent of skills training, decried 
pressures to commercialize practice, wondering whether “there is a place 
for a profession of law in what has been called, since the 1980s, the ‘legal 
services industry.’ ” 355  Both Kronman and MacCrate concluded that 
economic restructuring, particularly in large law firms, had made it 
harder for attorneys to live up to aspirations of service.356  Each believed 
that legal education could play a pivotal role in restoring norms of social 
trustee professionalism.357  Even so, Kronman struck a deeply 
pessimistic note, concluding that “the likelihood that the profession as a 
whole will awaken to the emptiness of its condition and there will be a 
great resurgence of support, at an institutional level, for the vanishing 
ideal of the lawyer-statesman seems . . . quite low.”358   
 
 
 
 
 354. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 2 (1993). The invocation of “an older 
set of values” could be nostalgic.  Worries about lost virtue and commercialized law practice 
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 356. Id. at 813-14; KRONMAN, supra note 354, at 273-307.   
 357. See MacCrate, supra note 355, at 812-15, 821-24; KRONMAN, supra note 354, at 
269-70. 
 358. KRONMAN, supra note 354, at 380.   
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A. A Profession Under Stress and the Prospect of a Fourth Age of 
Modern American Lawyering 
The contemporary crisis confronting the legal profession and legal 
education seems to confirm this gloomy assessment.  When the 
American Lawyer began to track “profits per partner” in large firms in 
1985, it reinforced perceptions of corporate attorneys as locked in a 
ruthless race for revenue. 359  The large firm mantra that “law is a 
business” has intensified as powerful corporate clients demand cost-
cutting measures and take legal work in-house to save money.360  In this 
highly competitive environment, there are concerns that large law firms 
will shirk their social obligations, including pro bono work.361  
Meanwhile, faced with narrowing profit margins, solo and small-firm 
practitioners also find it increasingly difficult to provide service to the 
needy.362  Even public interest attorneys, confronted with funding cuts 
and constraints on their discretion, have sometimes come to view public-
regarding obligations as inhering not in their work but in their self-
sacrificing personal characters.363   
As a result of these market changes, the organized bar has been 
grappling with intensifying stratification and fragmentation among 
practicing lawyers.  Between 1967 and 2010, the earnings gap between 
a law partner and a solo practitioner nearly tripled, according to Internal 
Revenue Service data on lawyer earnings.364  As large firm partners 
reaped unprecedented financial rewards, attorneys in public interest 
often earned incomes akin to those of social workers.365  Stratification 
 
 359. See BARTON, supra note 29, at 62-63, 70-71; MILTON REGAN & LISA ROHRER, LAW 
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Lawyers, But Law Is a Business,” 5(3) GP SOLO EREPORT (Oct. 2015), 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/gpsolo_ereport/2015/lawyers_law_is_business.ht
ml.   
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(Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2005) (describing tensions between professional 
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 364. BARTON, supra note 29, at 47. 
 365. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, Choosing, Nurturing, Training, and Placing Public 
Interest Law Students, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563, 1568 (2002); Ann Southworth, Our 
Fragmented Profession, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 431, 433-34 (2017); Jennifer Smith, 
Lawyer Salary Update: Class Warfare Edition, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2012; Huge Gap 
508 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:58 
led to fragmentation: lawyers in corporate firms rarely interacted with 
attorneys in other sectors of practice.  Instead, BigLaw attorneys mainly 
dealt with business clients and other corporate lawyers from around the 
world.366  Although the organized bar remains committed to a unified 
image of the profession, fragmentation has affected practitioners’ 
willingness to commit time and energy to any professional 
organization.367  ABA membership has steadily declined, 368 and niche 
bar associations now cater to the interests of particular constituencies.369  
Cause lawyers often see the National Lawyers Guild as more relevant to 
their professional lives,370 and government lawyers have created their 
own organizations.371  With growing diversity, identity-based bar 
associations have proliferated as well.372  As a result, any unified notion 
of professional identity is under considerable strain.373 
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Moreover, new ways of dispersing knowledge have left attorneys 
vulnerable to the perils of commoditization.  Lay people today can locate 
legal information, including cases, statutes, regulations, and legal forms, 
that once might have seemed beyond their reach.374  Growing dispersion 
of knowledge has led to increased interest in licensing non-lawyers and 
relying on software algorithms to perform routine legal tasks.375  As 
these technologies become more sophisticated, legal disputes 
increasingly can be resolved in virtual settings that displace the 
traditional forums that lawyers once monopolized.376  Dramatically 
expanded access to information and the rise of non-lawyer lawyering 
make claims of professionalism based on exclusive access to expertise 
increasingly difficult to sustain.377 
Forces of stratification and fragmentation also are at work in legal 
education.  Emphasizing the commodification of expertise, scholars 
today debate whether a law degree is a good investment based on present 
costs and projected lifetime earnings.378  With the focus on a degree’s 
financial yield, students have come to conclude that getting a lucrative 
law firm job is the sine qua non of legal education.  Those at top schools 
reap the rewards of BigLaw, while others struggle to pay off their 
debts.379  In this “winner takes all” environment, there is little, if any, 
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room for students to contemplate public-regarding obligations.380  Much 
as in law practice, dedication to the greater good is treated not as a 
professional duty but as a personal preference, which students must self-
finance by acquiring large amounts of student debt.381 
The profound question facing today’s lawyers and legal educators 
is whether these patterns of intensifying fragmentation and stratification 
within the profession will augur a fourth age of modern American 
lawyering.  If so, this age will stand in marked contrast to its 
predecessors.  The three prior ages of American lawyering were marked 
by relentless growth as new forms of practice emerged in response to 
dynamic social conditions.  Today, however, the focus is on how law 
practice will shrink and who will be left behind.382  In earlier ages, 
attorneys themselves were the primary drivers of innovations in 
corporate, government, and cause lawyering, but today, many of the 
pressures for change come from without.  Lawyers no longer seem to be 
fully in control of their destinies as technology companies offer services 
that threaten private practice and politicians push for deregulation that 
limits the need for government practice.383  Now, when firms like 
Dentons, DLA Piper, and Latham and Watkins invest in an artificial 
intelligence platform to bring down legal costs, it is not clear whether 
this is a reactive or proactive move.384  These firms may be mobilizing 
because they fear that others are already developing similar technologies 
 
 380. Garth, supra note 29, at 529-30. Recent empirical evidence suggests that legal 
education promotes a shift from intrinsic motivation to extrinsic rewards, contributing to 
heightened levels of dissatisfaction in both law school and law practice.  Lawrence S. Krieger 
& Kennon M. Sheldon, What Makes Lawyers Happy?: A Data-Driven Prescription to 
Redefine Professional Success, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 554, 566-69, 623-25 (2015). 
 381. See Erica Field, Educational Debt Burden and Career Choice: Evidence from a 
Financial Aid Experiment at NYU Law School 2-3, 5, 7-9, 15-17 (Dec. 2007), 
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/field/files/field_nyu_13108-1.pdf?m=1360040259 
(describing different levels of commitment to public interest careers between students who 
received fee waivers and students who received equivalent loan forgiveness).  Though loan 
forgiveness programs mitigate the financial burden, graduates run the risk that terms will be 
modified or plans eliminated before they can take advantage of them.  Public Service Loan 
Forgiveness: Questions and Answers for Federal Student Loan Borrowers, FED. STUDENT 
AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/public-service-loan-forgiveness-
common-questions.pdf; Shannon Najmabadi, A Year Before Public-Service Loan Forgiveness 
Kicks In, Uncertainty Looms, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 18, 2016. 
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or they could be seeking to chart their own futures.  Or, it could be a little 
of both.   
B. The Future of Professionalism in an Uncertain World 
With all of these strains on the legal profession, the rhetoric of crisis 
has become commonplace, though as some have noted, the term “crisis” 
has been overused in discussing the future of law and lawyers.385  Even 
so, two major challenges to traditional notions of professionalism have 
been born of this sense of crisis.  One is a call to ballast professionalism 
altogether.  Law professor Thomas D. Morgan has concluded that the 
“use of the idea of a ‘profession’ to understand the world of lawyers 
obstructs clear thinking about what lawyers actually do and how they are 
likely to have to respond to the world they face.”386  In his view, social 
trusteeship is irrelevant because praiseworthy moral conduct should be 
attributed not to professional identity but to personal character.387  As for 
expert professionalism, Morgan acknowledges that lawyers possess 
valuable knowledge and skills, but he concludes that this merely makes 
them “economic actors, specially trained, but driven by all of the vices—
and virtues—of a capitalist economic system.”388  As a result, he finds 
that neither public obligation nor technical expertise justifies 
professional status.   
Legal scholar Russell Pearce reaches conclusions similar to 
Morgan’s.  Because traditional concepts of professionalism cannot be 
reconciled with the idea that law is a business, Pearce searches for a 
Middle Range approach that “would permit the community of legal 
service providers to develop a moral aspiration for their work consistent 
with the commercial context of law practice and free of the perceived 
hypocrisy of the Professionalism Paradigm.”389  Under his approach, the 
organized bar would continue to certify lawyers’ credentials, but this 
would not lead to an exclusive license to provide legal services.390  With 
both lawyers and non-lawyers permitted to deliver legal advice, Pearce 
believes that there would be more vigorous efforts to protect consumers 
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than is currently the case.391  In addition, competition from non-lawyers 
could enhance the quality of legal services for low- and middle-income 
persons.392  Finally, by overcoming the cynicism generated by 
contradictory notions of professionalism, Pearce contends that legal 
service providers would be free to have a meaningful dialogue about 
developing a community ethic of service.393  Like Morgan, Pearce hopes 
that upending archaic conventions will “provide[] the legal community 
with the opportunity to turn from lamenting the decline of 
professionalism to the more important work of improving the delivery 
of legal services and promoting justice.”394 
Still other scholars call for the legal profession to dispense with its 
unified image and openly recognize its deeply divided nature.  These 
proposals are not of a piece, and their differences reveal the fault lines 
of professionalism in intriguing ways.  One type of proposal emphasizes 
the distinction between expert professionalism and social trustee 
professionalism and proposes an amicable divorce.  After questioning 
the bar’s commitment to “a single profession of law,”395 legal scholar 
Gillian K. Hadfield explicitly rejects the idea that all attorneys should be 
dedicated to protecting and upholding the foundations of American 
democracy.396  In her view, the legal system serves two very different 
functions: the safeguarding of political and democratic institutions on 
the one hand and the promotion of efficient market transactions on the 
other.397  These functions should be disaggregated so that differentiated 
legal professions can evolve.398  In particular, she argues that the public-
regarding aspects of law unduly interfere with efficient operation of the 
private market.399  Hadfield proposes that “[t]he financial interests of 
lawyers should be reined in where access to legal services is necessary 
to protect democratic interests rooted in our normative goals of equality, 
dignity, fairness, and individual wellbeing. . . .”400  However, “where the 
interests at stake are the profit-making endeavors of entities, our primary 
concern in the design of regulation should be the efficiency of legal 
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markets and their capacity to promote the efficiency of other markets.”401  
In Hadfield’s bifurcated account of law practice, expert professionalism 
dominates the market, while public values at the heart of social 
trusteeship become part of an amorphous catchall of norms beyond the 
scope of efficient exchange.402 
Hadfield’s proposal speaks directly to Kronman and MacCrate’s 
anxieties about the perils to social trusteeship that market restructuring 
poses, and it seems likely to bring little comfort to those who see public-
regarding obligations as inhering in legal professionalism, regardless of 
practice sector.  Her notion of bifurcation stands in marked contrast to 
that of law professor Brian Tamanaha.  He too has questioned the unified 
nature of the bar, this time by assailing the homogeneity of legal 
education—enforced through the accreditation process and entrenched 
by law school rankings.403  Much as Alfred Z. Reed proposed to 
differentiate among law schools, 404 Tamanaha has recommended 
creation of a two-track system with elite institutions offering traditional 
academic programs of instruction while other law schools provide 
affordable, practice-oriented training.405  He argues that “[t]he legal 
profession has never been unitary in the nature of the work done by 
lawyers or in their compensation.”406  So, “[a] law graduate who wishes 
to engage in a local practice need not acquire, or pay for, the same 
education as a graduate aiming for corporate legal practice.”407  
Tamanaha believes that lower-cost degrees could promote access to the 
profession among the middle class and poor, and restructuring legal 
education could enhance opportunities to serve clients who currently 
lack access to legal services.408   
In a 2014 report, the ABA Task Force on the Future of Legal 
Education recognizes the same divide as Tamanaha does.  The Task 
Force acknowledges that “[i]t matters greatly whether . . . one takes a 
view of lawyers as primarily deliverers of technical services requiring a 
certain skill or expertise, or as persons who are broad-based problem 
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solvers and societal leaders.”409  The Task Force equates “[t]he 
traditional emphasis on legal education as delivering public value” with 
“a focus on quality of legal education as an overriding goal by law 
schools.”410  By contrast, “the new emphasis on consumer 
considerations—and more broadly on legal education as a private  
good—has had the opposite tendency,” with a push to drive down 
prices.411  Though purporting to strike a middle ground, the Commission 
emphatically concludes that “law schools are in the business of 
delivering legal education services.”412  Unsurprisingly, with this 
commercial orientation, the report focuses almost entirely on inculcating 
technical competencies in the most cost-effective way.413   
A natural outgrowth of the proposal to offer two-tiered law degrees 
is the push to certify the legal competencies of non-lawyers.414  
According to a 2013 Hanover Research report, approximately twenty 
law schools had degrees of this kind, 415 and the programs now are 
common enough to merit a list on the ABA Section of Legal Education’s 
website.416  Some commentators have expressed doubts about the value 
of the credentials, which remain largely unregulated and untested 
commodities.417  As skeptic Kyle McEntee, Executive Director of Law 
School Transparency, observes, non-J.D. programs may simply be 
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offered “as a cash grab—not because people actually need them.”418  
Whatever the actual value, these degrees are a concession to the 
declining professional monopoly on legal expertise. 
The notion of bifurcation in the legal academy is strikingly different 
from Hadfield’s account of the split in the legal profession.  Creating 
two tracks of law schools reconstructs expert professionalism by 
establishing tiers of mastery that have little or nothing to do with social 
trusteeship.  In the three prior ages of modern American lawyering, the 
most intense contests focused on the scope of lawyers’ public 
obligations—whether to protect the integrity of the legal process, to 
serve the public in government positions, or to challenge societal 
injustice through litigation and other forms of advocacy.  Each 
innovation in lawyering expanded the landscape of practice, creating 
new ways for lawyers to apply their expertise but also new ways to serve 
the public at large.  In an era of contraction, Tamanaha’s proposal alerts 
us that a fourth age of modern American lawyering may openly contest 
the previously uncontroversial notion of expert professionalism as a 
unifying feature of lawyers’ identity.  No longer will it be possible to 
assume that a shared level of expertise is a sine qua non for the delivery 
of legal services.  As a result, expert professionalism itself will be 
destabilized, further complicating debates about how public-regarding 
obligations grow out of the privileges that come with the technical 
mastery of law. 
C. The Way Forward: Deepening Our Understanding of the Symbiotic 
Relationship Between Social Trustee and Expert Professionalism 
To address claims that the current crisis will undo conventional 
notions of professionalism, lawyers and legal educators must remember 
to look not only at Kronman’s and MacCrate’s concerns that social 
trusteeship will be displaced by market forces but also the real possibility 
that expertise will be unbundled in ways that are themselves de-
professionalizing.  In considering whether these dangers are imminent, 
the practicing bar and legal educators should work together to identify 
the changing parameters of expert professionalism as well as the 
pressures on social trustee professionalism.  A more nuanced 
understanding of lawyers’ everyday lives can illuminate the complex 
and symbiotic ways in which social trustee and expert professionalism 
contribute to workplace identities.  That deepened appreciation in turn 
can offer insights into the resiliency of professionalism as practice 
environments are transformed. 
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With respect to expert professionalism, the organized bar should 
partner with law professors and empirical scholars to evaluate which 
skills have been critical to lawyers’ success, which new skills may be 
emerging that affect success, and which skills are most likely to be 
commoditized and hence become less relevant to success.  Professors 
Marjorie M. Shultz and Sheldon Zedeck have done important work that 
bears on these questions.419  Their research draws on interviews with 
alumni of Berkeley Law School, clients, faculty, students, and judges as 
well as focus groups and an online survey of alumni to assess factors 
important to lawyer effectiveness.420  Interestingly, Shultz and Zedeck 
have identified a number of relevant factors that are independent of 
conventional measures of cognitive ability, such as grade point averages 
and Law School Admission Test (LSAT) scores.421  These factors relate 
to personality traits like optimism, ambition, and stress management, 
interpersonal sensitivity, and the capacity for situated judgment.422  
According to Shultz and Zedeck, these non-cognitive factors often prove 
to be more highly correlated with lawyer performance than academic 
measures. 423  A later study by Educating Tomorrow’s Lawyers has 
confirmed these findings.424  Drawing on a nation-wide survey of over 
24,000 attorneys who work in a wide range of settings, Alli Gerkman 
and Logan Cornett report that along with intellectual aptitude and legal 
skills, young lawyers must display emotional intelligence, an ability to 
communicate effectively, as well as character traits that demonstrate 
honesty, integrity, and reliability.425  Gerkman and Cornett conclude 
that: 
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Intelligence, on its own, is not enough.  Technical legal skills are not 
enough. [Attorneys] require a broader set of characteristics (or, the 
character quotient), professional competencies, and legal skills that, 
when taken together, produce a whole lawyer.  When we value any 
one foundation, like intelligence, and when we value any one group 
of foundations, like legal skills, we shortchange not only the 
potential of that lawyer—we also shortchange the clients who rely 
on them.426 
According to this research, accounts of expert professionalism that 
focus narrowly on substantive knowledge and technical skills 
significantly understate the complexity of what it takes to be an effective 
lawyer.427  Non-cognitive factors enable lawyers to better assess the 
contexts in which legal problems arise and to make superior situated 
judgments for their clients.  These abilities transcend any particular 
transaction.  For example, the capacity to cultivate relationships with 
colleagues and clients along with the ability to develop strategic plans 
for large-scale undertakings can be critical to preserving a law firm’s 
health.  Partners can recognize and reward these talents, for example, by 
using firm citizenship as well as origination of new business and number 
of billable hours to set compensation.428   
As for emerging skills that are increasingly relevant to success, 
some preliminary research bears on this question.  In a study of large law 
firm partners done after the 2008 recession, researchers Milton Regan 
and Lisa Rohrer found that entrepreneurial skills have grown in 
significance in determining partner compensation, mobility, and job 
security.429  As one partner explains, “You need to be a good technical 
lawyer, but that is sort of table stakes not to get fired.”430  With respect 
to bringing in new clients, lawyers must be able to make themselves 
known through networking, make successful pitches for business, and 
maintain relationships.431  But just as importantly, for the majority of 
attorneys who cannot expect to be rainmakers, there is a need for internal 
marketing to ensure that other partners refer matters to them.432  As one 
lawyer explained, this means “getting to know partners, trying to get 
opportunities to work with them, and getting your name around to 
partners in other offices.”433  Even if self-promotion has always figured 
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in growing a law practice, the economic downturn in 2008 intensified 
these pressures, leading one partner to muse that: 
What I didn’t realize was how much of a business the practice of law 
is.  I spend a very significant part of my time just managing the 
practice and managing my relationship with the law firm and 
managing my relationship with my clients.  And I spend a very 
significant portion of my time worrying about business development 
. . . . I am my own sales force.  I am my own marketing force.  I also 
have to service all my clients at the same time and I am effectively 
my own billing department . . . . So you find yourself a small 
business within a law firm, and I had no idea that I would be running, 
literally running, a small business in a law firm.434   
What the Regan and Rohrer study suggests, then, is that the rigors 
of the market are forcing attorneys to hone their entrepreneurial skills, 
but these capacities supplement rather than supplant the traditional ones 
that have made for a successful lawyer.   
As for which skills are apt to be more or less durable in the face of 
commoditization, Richard Susskind’s work offers some guideposts.435  
He describes how bespoke work that is “traditional, hand-crafted, one-
to-one consultative professional service, highly tailored for the specific 
needs of particular clients” becomes commoditized.436  When legal tasks 
are done on a recurring basis, bespoke work grows increasingly 
standardized.  This routinization takes place, even if the service is still 
“delivered in a highly personalized manner, with regular, direct contact 
between the lawyer and the client.”437  Once standardization occurs, the 
legal service can be systematized through automation; initially, these 
technologies will be for internal use only.438  Later, this internal system 
is made directly accessible to clients through packaging of the legal 
services, thus permitting non-lawyers to learn about pressing legal 
concerns.439  The final stage in this evolutionary process occurs with 
commoditization, when packages of legal services are “very readily 
available in the market, often from a variety of sources, and certainly at 
highly competitive prices.”440 
As Susskind notes, lawyers fear that legal practice will be less 
prestigious and less remunerative if “high quality service, charged at a 
reasonable price and subject to regular update and maintenance, can be 
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delivered in standardized, systematized, and packaged form.”441  These 
anxieties clearly figure in concerns that there is a crisis in the legal 
profession and legal education.  Yet, examples of commoditization 
mainly focus on how certain fields of knowledge cease to be novel and 
become mundane.  There is no discussion of practice conditions that 
generate innovation and replenish the realm of bespoke practice even as 
commoditization is occurring in other areas.  For example, innovation 
may turn on collaboration that enables lawyers to think outside the box 
about their practices.  While the process of nurturing creativity 
undoubtedly implicates cognitive capacities, it also may depend on non-
cognitive talents that enhance collegial exchange and deepen client 
relationships.  Skills related to communication and facilitation can 
enable lawyers to appreciate how practice contexts are changing and to 
convene the teams that will address those changes effectively.  Then, 
entrepreneurial abilities can help to alert clients to the next big thing in 
bespoke practice.  This broader understanding of professional expertise 
affords some comfort in the face of commoditization.  By moving 
beyond a focus on technical knowledge, lawyers can consider how to 
develop practices that identify and capitalize on emerging opportunities 
as the market for legal services shifts.   
Similar efforts are needed to address fears that intensifying 
pressures to focus on the bottom line will eclipse social trusteeship.  
Most of these concerns relate to the profit motive crowding out a sense 
of public obligation at large law firms.442  Returning to the Regan and 
Rohrer study, their interviews reveal that partners at major firms are 
struggling to reconcile market forces with professional values.443  Law 
firm culture—especially as expressed through the compensation 
process—expresses these dual commitments.  While some firms may 
have an “eat what you kill” model that treats law like a business, most 
firms encourage a more balanced approach by recognizing contributions 
to the wellbeing of the firm as well to the good of society.  For example, 
compensation committees recognize cooperative behavior as a way to 
signal that collegiality is a core value at the firm.444  In addition, 
committees count pro bono work as a contribution to the firm’s 
collective commitments.445  Through these compensation decisions, 
firms acknowledge that “many lawyers value the opportunity to be of 
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service to clients, to work in a collegial atmosphere, to do high-quality 
work, to participate in work that is intrinsically meaningful, and to be of 
some service to society.”446  As Regan and Rohrer conclude, “[n]ot all 
firms will necessarily attempt to give meaningful weight to professional 
values.  Furthermore, even those that do will not necessarily succeed in 
striking a credible balance.  Our research suggests, however, that it 
matters to many partners that their firms make the effort to do so.”447   
Regan and Rohrer’s study suggests that partners are not yet ready 
to ballast professionalism and enter a fourth age of modern American 
lawyering.  But to fully answer questions about the future of the legal 
profession and legal education, additional work is needed.  A high 
proportion of the research done so far has focused on the large law firm.  
Although major firms are important opinion leaders in the profession, it 
is critical to consider the portfolio of skills that make for effective 
lawyers in other practice settings, including solo and small law firms, in-
house counsel departments, government agencies, and public interest 
organizations.  Without a broader inquiry, lawyers and legal educators 
can only speculate about how notions of expert professionalism are 
changing outside the corporate law firm. 
For similar reasons, there should be additional study of how 
lawyers in government and public interest define social trusteeship.  As 
law professor Ann Southworth has noted, “[w]orkplaces and practice 
specialties play an important role in ‘lawyer socialization’ and the ‘day-
to-day interpretation of professional standards.’ ” 448  Moreover, the 
professional ideals generated in different practice settings vary based on 
“lawyers’ economic, power, and status goals.”449  An unduly narrow 
focus on large law firms or an unduly broad emphasis on the profession 
as a whole can obscure the “ethical pluralism” that informs the meaning 
of social trusteeship in a range of practice environments.450  An 
acknowledgment of these diverse commitments could reveal the limits 
of a polarized, binary rhetoric that pits market forces against public 
obligation.  In fact, one source of social trusteeship’s ongoing influence 
may be its capacity for adaptation to new practice settings.  As the field 
of law changes, trusteeship can evolve to take account of new ways to 
serve the greater good while accommodating the unique features of 
distinct sectors of the profession.  In a field traditionally united by 
common technical competencies, expertise serves as an important source 
of shared professional identity.  Yet, the capacity for differentiation in a 
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range of practice environments may be a critical source of resilience and 
relevancy for social trusteeship.   
To undertake inquiries like these, it will be important for leaders in 
the bar and legal education to join forces.  In this spirit, Ben W. 
Heineman, Jr., William F. Lee, and David B. Wilkins have made the case 
for elite law schools, large law firms, and in-house counsel at major 
corporations to work cooperatively in thinking about lawyers’ 
professional identity. 451  Although most people identify lawyers as 
technical experts, Heineman, Lee, and Wilkins contend that attorneys 
also have to be wise counselors who consider not only what the law is 
but what it might become.452  These counselors should evaluate both the 
course of action that is legally permitted and the one that is right in light 
of a particular client’s goals.  To serve as a wise counselor, lawyers must 
have the capacity for situated judgment, the ability to facilitate exchange 
among multiple stakeholders, and the skill to seek out and listen to non-
lawyers with unique insights into a client’s aims and culture.453  In 
addition, many lawyers will assume positions of leadership, and in these 
roles, they also will need to be able to make decisions, manage 
organizations and situations, and hew to ethical precepts.454 
Although Heineman, Lee, and Wilkins emphasize elite sectors of 
practice, all law schools can partner with attorneys in different practice 
sectors to consider the skills needed for successful law practice.  By 
undertaking such efforts, legal educators will be heeding the call of the 
Carnegie report on “Educating Lawyers,” which urged law schools to 
address three apprenticeships: the first emphasizing legal analysis or 
thinking like a lawyer; the second addressing the practical skills of 
lawyering; and the third dealing with the role of the lawyer in the larger 
society.455  The Carnegie report concludes that schools do an excellent 
job with the first apprenticeship, which enables students to master the 
doctrinal intricacies of the law.456  And, law schools are doing a better 
job at preparing students for the practice of law through expanded 
experiential learning courses.457  Yet, schools continue to lag in 
addressing the third apprenticeship.  In particular, they fail to afford 
students enough “opportunities to learn about, reflect on, and practice 
the responsibilities of legal professionals.  Despite progress in making 
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legal ethics a part of the curriculum, law schools rarely pay consistent 
attention to the social and cultural contexts of legal institutions and to 
the varied forms of legal practice.”458  Pursuing inquiries into the 
changing nature of the skills needed for successful practice could enable 
schools to refine their experiential learning programs and to explore 
social trusteeship in different practice settings.  This work should enable 
law school faculty, alumni, and students alike to reflect on their unique 
professional obligations as lawyers.  Students in particular could 
participate in the research as a way to promote a deeper understanding 
of expert and social trustee professionalism as they prepare to lead the 
field of law into its uncertain but dynamic future. 
CONCLUSION 
It is too early to conclude that a crisis in the legal profession and 
legal education is redefining modern American lawyering as we know 
it.  But efforts to refine our understanding of the knowledge, skills, and 
social responsibilities that define successful law practice are long 
overdue.  Too often, today’s accounts of lawyering create a sharp 
dichotomy between “law as a business” and “law as a profession,” 
pitting expert and social trustee professionalism against one another.  In 
fact, available research offers a far more nuanced picture in which both 
forms of professionalism figure in attorneys’ sense of their status and 
satisfaction.  Rather than dispense altogether with the language of 
professionalism, we must interrogate the concept more carefully.  Only 
in that way can we navigate challenging times with a compass that is true 
to our past and open to our future. 
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